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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Internet and its connected innovative technologies are fostering the digital economy and society, 
one of the main objectives of the European Union (EU) and by consequence of the new European 
Commission. In fact, the deployment of New Generation Networks to ensure specific targets in 
terms of availability and adoption of fast and high quality Internet connections for European 
households is one of the main pillars of the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) 2020. In spite of the 
relatively wide set of policy tools put in place at the European and national level, profound 
differences in terms of broadband coverage and adoption do however persist across member 
States. These disparities have largely contributed to a feeling of dissatisfaction for the level of 
investment in broadband networks in Europe. Partly as a response to this view, the European 
Commission opened a public consultation to assess the need for broadband speed and quality 
beyond 2020.  
Following the questions posed by the consultation, this Report intends to focus on targets, i.e. the 
meta-instrument that precedes the implementation of more traditional policy instruments, such as 
national plans, sector-specific regulation, competition policy and direct public intervention. In 
particular, the Report aims at exploring the impact of setting future targets for ultra-fast 
broadband, also considering the opportunity, and the risks, of formulating targets that specifically 
favour higher performing technological solutions, i.e. FTTH, which enables connection speeds well 
above 100 Mbps, over others, i.e. cable, copper, wireless technologies or a mix of them. 
The reason why broadband targets of the kind that have so far been set at the EU level deserve a 
special attention is that, being voluntary and non-binding, they may appear relatively innocuous. 
Yet, they are susceptible of driving the direction of future policies and consequently investment to a 
significant extent. Targets influence each of the policy tools that have so far played a role in 
broadband promotion, particularly national broadband plans, regulation and public investment. 
These policy levers, in turn, exert material effects on competitive dynamics and incentives to invest 
of private operators.  
The first question the Report deals with is the rationale for uniform targets to promote broadband 
in the EU and the rationale for targets specified in terms of extended coverage of ultra-fast 
broadband technologies. In this regard, the analysis suggests that the setting of uniform targets 
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does not appear to rest on a solid economic rationale either within countries or across countries. 
Data show that, in general, broadband penetration and adoption do produce sizeable 
externalities, which may justify the introduction of public policies to support broadband rollout and 
adoption. However, broadband impact on the economy tends to be very heterogeneous. 
Broadband has effects, e.g. on growth and/or employment, when used by firms or individuals with 
particular characteristics in particular areas, and therefore it is difficult to extrapolate broadband 
impact when used by firms or individuals without those characteristics or in different areas. Thus, 
even within countries, the rationale for uniform targets does not appear to be economically robust.  
As for targets specified in terms of extended coverage of ultra-fast broadband technologies, we 
can conclude that the existing evidence is not sufficient to make a case for expressing a preference 
across the board for FTTH solutions. To clearly support the view that an extension of ultra-fast 
broadband targets would be justified, it would be necessary to find evidence either of the fact 
that significant positive externalities are not reflected in the current level of demand for ultra-fast 
broadband, so that there is a wedge between social goals and individual choices, or that a 
sufficient willingness to pay exists that is not met by private demand. The available empirical 
evidence does not confirm either of these elements.  
These conclusions are corroborated also by the analysis of fast and ultra-fast broadband demand. 
The Report highlights the extreme heterogeneity existing as regards adoption and take-up of 
broadband technologies as well as adoption and take-up of fast vs. ultra-fast technologies. A 
specific gap between adoption and coverage is evident between EU founding members and 
Eastern European countries. Thus, also from this perspective, it can be safely concluded that one 
size does not fit all. In particular, attention should be paid to the fact that the economic rationale 
for investing in FTTH solutions is different for countries where substantial investment in copper 
upgrades has already been sunk as opposed to countries where the choice of technology may be 
less influenced by past investment. 
Also, the available evidence on Next Generation Networks (NGN) demand is scant and unable to 
clearly provide empirical support to the proposition that more ambitious ultra-fast broadband 
targets than those currently embedded in the DAE would be justified on solid economic grounds. 
Most of the (weak) economic evidence suggests that customers are likely to have high incremental 
willingness to pay for a high speed service, but a low incremental willingness to pay for a very 
high speed service.  
An additional issue that has been considered in the Report is whether there may be other market 
failures, additional to externalities, that may suggest to promote specific technologies – FTTP vs. 
FTTC or FTTH P2P vs. PMP. In particular, the possibility that departures from the technology 
neutrality (TN) principle may be justified on the grounds that they could allow to address problems 
deriving from the persistent relevance of bottlenecks owned by incumbent operators was explored. 
In this regard the Report concludes that the original rationale for TN remains in principle valid as 
any overly specific approach brings its own dangers. Prescribing specific technological solutions 
does not allow to exploit firms’ comparative information advantage as regards the costs and 
benefits of different technologies. All in all, even though TN should always be considered an 
instrumental principle, which may be abandoned if a solid economic supports the notion that it may 
conflict with other fundamental objectives, any departure from it should be grounded on solid 
analysis and be undertaken with caution.   
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Finally, the Report provides insights as to the consequences and desirability of the voluntary and 
non-binding nature of the targets. This soft ‘industrial policy’ approach has some advantages. The 
first is that it appears more compatible with the overarching principle in policy design that 
indicates that policy makers should adopt the measures that make the best use of private 
information. From this perspective, a mere indication of the preferred broadband deployment 
outcomes in terms of coverage and speed fares comparatively better than one that prescribes 
specific network designs or inputs. Moreover, the fact that targets are uniform on paper, but not 
necessarily in practice, may be conceived to leave room for differences at the implementation 
stage that can take into account heterogeneities as well as different starting points at the country 
level. 
However, targets inspired by political desiderata shape both private and public operators’ 
expectations in ways that are not necessarily compatible with the very objectives that those targets 
are meant to pursue, even if they do not involve strict enforcement or commitment of public 
resources. First, private operators’ expectation that public resources will be found, sooner or later, 
to back the EU-level targets may result in a waiting game, whereby private investment may be 
delayed even in areas where a business case would otherwise exist, because to wait promises to 
deliver benefits in terms of a public subsidy that substitutes in part for private investment. This may 
give rise to sub optimal results from the perspective of the DAE objectives from two, equally 
troubling, perspectives: either investment does not happen at all, or it follow too late, in case of 
scarce public funds; or investment occurs, but simply with public money crowding out private 
investment.  
The effects of targets on public decision-makers’ expectations and policy choices in the 
heterogeneous EU member States may be equally problematic. To bring concrete results, ambitious 
targets should find support in significant amounts of public investment. An outcome where public 
investment increases substantially is, however, not only relatively unlikely, but also by and large 
undesirable, since public investment, as is well known, carries a concrete risk of crowding out or 
else distorting private investment.  
Moreover, higher targets would induce public decision-makers to make possibly misguided choices 
as regard the trade-off between coverage and performance. In particular, uniform targets 
focusing public investment on ultra-fast broadband technologies almost automatically reduce 
coverage, because more resources are required to meet the targets in any given area. Finally, 
there is a risk that far-reaching targets induce public investment to be biased towards supply-side 
policies, at the expenses of demand-side policies, so that coverage would be promoted at the 
expenses of adoption. Since, however, it is actual use of technologies rather than availability of 
networks per se that generates social welfare, it is doubtful that this outcome can be considered 
truly desirable.  
In conclusion, a soft industrial policy in favour of the development of the NGNs throughout Europe 
can be certainly considered a worthy policy objective, but its concrete declination and application 
must pass all the necessary examinations of economic rationality and industrial realism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the Affair of so much Importance to you, wherein you ask my Advice, I cannot 
for want of sufficient Premises, advise you what to determine, but if you please I 
will tell you how. …To get over this, my Way is, to divide half a Sheet of Paper 
by a Line into two Columns, writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con.  
…And tho' the Weight of Reasons cannot be taken with the Precision of Algebraic 
Quantities, yet when each is thus considered separately and comparatively, and the 
whole lies before me, I think I can judge better, and am less likely to take a rash 
Step; and in fact I have found great Advantage from this kind of Equation, in what 
may be called Moral or Prudential Algebra.  
Benjamin Franklin (1772), Letter to Joseph Priestley. 
 
 
The deployment of the New Generation Networks that ensure the availability of an Internet 
connection at a minimum speed of 30 Mbps for all European citizens, and above 100 Mbps for at 
least 50% of European households, is one of the main pillars of the DAE 2020.  
The European Commission has recently opened a public consultation to look into the needs for 
broadband speed and quality beyond 2020. The purpose of the new consultation was to 
understand and assess the needs relating to Internet speed by taking into account all of the 
stakeholders’ views - households, businesses, public institutions – in order to develop an adequate 
and possibly future-proof public policy.  
In the past, to promote the development of the digital economy and society, and, specifically, to 
pursue the targets of the DAE, the European Commission and member States have intervened using 
several different policy approaches. In principle, they have adopted a threefold strategy: to 
organize the plans that are finalized, so as to reach the targets for coverage; to adopt regulations 
that are favourable to investment; and to finance direct interventions in building networks, all 
joined to some form of demand side policy. 
First, EU policy has involved the translation, by the member States, of the above-mentioned 
European voluntary targets for the coverage, adoption and speed of Internet connections, into 
national broadband plans. The plans, as well as the results, however, have varied widely 
throughout Europe. Second, some regulatory provisions have been re-examined with the intent to 
favour network investment and to foster the development of facilities-based competition in the 
European electronic communications markets. This process, however, has been, and still is, the 
subject of intense debate. Third, public direct investment in networks, at the central or local levels, 
have been explicitly endorsed as a means to stimulate the broadband rollout, not only in rural or 
poor geographical areas, where it would have been otherwise commercially unprofitable, but also, 
to some extent, in areas where existing broadband infrastructures were not perceived to be 
adequate, in light of the targets set at the European and national levels.  Even this activity has not 
given the expected results. 
Together with these supply-side policies, there have been scattered attempts of policies aimed to 
promote the adoption of broadband through incentives to the demand-side of the market. 
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In spite of the relatively wide set of policy tools put in place at the European and national levels, 
profound differences, in terms of broadband coverage and adoption, thus persist across the 
member States.1 These disparities have largely contributed to the recent dissatisfaction at the level 
of investment in broadband networks. This is a feeling that has contributed to worsening the 
common perception of the result achieved in Europe so far, even when objective data suggest that 
the present situation, on average, is no worse than in competing areas of the world, for instance, in 
the USA.2   
By partially interpreting this discontent, the consultation called for a new set of policies for the 
future Digital Agenda.  
Following the questions posed by the consultation, this Report intends to focus on targets, i.e., the 
meta-instruments preceding the implementation of more traditional policy instruments, such as 
national plans, sector-specific regulation, competition policy, and direct public intervention (in the 
form of substitute or gap investment). The coverage and/or the speed broadband targets are 
usually introduced by defining the percentage of the population that needs to be served by 
broadband with the specific service level that is chosen for the referenced territory. Similar 
measures are used for the adoption targets. Once targets are defined, they have to be translated 
into actual policy plans by comparing them against the actual situation.  
In particular, the Report aims to explore the impact of setting future targets for ultra-fast 
broadband, also considering the opportunity, and the risks, of formulating targets that specifically 
favour higher performing technological solutions, i.e., FTTH, which enables connection speeds well 
above 100 Mbps, over others, i.e., cable or copper.3 Indeed, given the present widespread 
(though, to some extent, misguided) perception of the relatively scarce performance of the EU, in 
terms of the uniformity of broadband indicators across member States, as well as in terms of 
international benchmarking, it might be tempting to set more challenging targets than those 
currently embodied in the DAE.  
The reason why broadband targets deserve specific attention is that, being voluntary and non-
binding, they may appear relatively innocuous. Yet, they are susceptible to drive the direction of 
future policies and, consequently, of investment, to a significant extent. Targets influence each of 
the policy tools that have so far played a role in broadband promotion, particularly national 
broadband plans, regulation and public investment. These policy levers, in turn, exert material 
effects on the competitive dynamics and incentives to invest for private operators.  
While speed and adoption quantitative targets apparently respect the principle of technological 
neutrality, this is true only to the extent that the targets that are actually set do not fall out of the 
characteristics of certain industrially and economically alive technologies. For instance, setting a 
target that is very high in terms of speed, may foreclose on certain technologies that are available 
in the market at lower costs. 
In particular, setting ultra-fast broadband targets that are too ambitious may impose constraints on 
the choice between different types of FTTx technologies, between wireline and wireless solutions, 
and may foreclose in some of the most innovative hybrid solutions. The main focus of this Report will 
                                              
1 European Commission (2015b). 
2 SamKnows Report (2013). 
3 In this Report ’ultra-fast broadband’ refers to the fastest  FTTx architectures available, i.e., ,Fiber-to-the-home and Fiber-to-
the building (FTTH/B). FTTH and FTTB technologies are jointly referred to as Fiber-to-the-Premises (FTTP). ‘Fast broadband’, in 
turn, also includes hybrid-fiber copper and coax technologies (FTTC/VDSL Vectoring and FTTLA/DOCSIS 3.0). This distinction 
between fiber technologies into the fast (over 30 Mbps) and the ultra-fast (over 100 Mbps) categories, is somewhat blurred. 
However, we will define as ultra-fast those technologies that can guarantee 100 Mbps symmetrical speed for every subscriber 
at all times. 
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be on wireline technologies, in light of the fact that they have so far posed the greatest challenges 
in terms of investment incentives and regulation. However, the wireless solutions so far considered are 
mostly complementary to wireline technologies, and they may show increasing degrees of 
substitutability with wireline alternatives in the future.  
The pace of technological change in this domain is extremely fast, so uncertainty over the appropriate 
technological choices makes most medium- to long-term forecasts unreliable. Consider, for instance, two 
recent developments that illustrate the fast speed of technological evolution. One is hybrid broadband 
access, which combines fixed and mobile access, in a search for maximum quality of service and 
coverage at minimum costs. In the same line one might mention the Google Project Fi, a concept and 
technology with a very disruptive potential, combining different mobile networks into a hybrid that 
automatically uses the best mobile signal available, while also incorporating WiFi calling (“voice over 
WiFi”).  
Departing from technological neutrality to pursue the ‘future proof’ technologies of today may 
incautiously exclude the future technologies of tomorrow. Our analysis moves from the premise that 
there is an essential need for targets to be set, not according to political imperatives, but, rather, 
after a careful technological and economic analysis. Such an analysis must be rooted in a 
comparison between the social costs and benefits of the investment to be made, including also the 
prospective policies that are needed to achieve that objective. There therefore needs to be an 
overall awareness of the current situation of broadband deployment and of its future 
developments, both in terms of demand, supply (e.g., the type of applications, the level of 
competition) and in terms of technological advances, in order to be able to set sensible, useful and, 
above all, realistic targets. The effect of unique targets in the presence of a differentiated starting 
situation also calls for a thorough analysis of the possible implications and consequences.   
The role of broadband targets as policy instruments will be examined in regard to their rationale 
and their interaction with several different dimensions of the industry. To this purpose, the authors 
review the relevant economic literature on the impact that the connection targets of national and 
supra-national broadband plans may have on telecommunications markets in terms of their 
structure, competition and regulation.  
The structure of the Report is as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the role of broadband targets and 
discusses their economic implications and consequences. In particular, it considers the issue of the 
various forms of externalities that are associated with broadband availability and that motivate 
the setting of digital targets. Chapter 2 proposes an analysis of the demand for ultra-fast 
broadband. This is done by considering the demand perspectives from the point of view of 
technology (theoretical band requirements) and economics (willingness to pay). A key issue that is 
addressed in this chapter concerns the existence of the network effects that are associated with 
NGNs, a point that is already widely recognized, and the issue of whether these effects are linked 
to some specific level of speed or adoption. Network effects are a special type of externality that 
is related to the broadband adoption process: increases in the adoption rates lead to increases in 
the usage intensity of the respective services, but it remains unclear whether this depends on a 
specific (minimum) quality of service. Chapter 3 is centred on supply-related issues, and, 
specifically, on the relationship between targets, technological neutrality and regulation. Whether 
TN constitutes a value in itself, and which are the consequences for public choices of the alternative 
responses to these questions is discussed. Chapter 4 moves from the present markets’ configurations 
of the European electronic communications industry and the limited role played, so far, by public 
intervention. In particular, it analyses and discusses how public intervention, by deciding to force TN 
in order to reach coverage and/or adoption targets, may reshape market structures and, 
consequently, may influence competition dynamics in the future. The chapter also considers the 
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impact of higher targets on the various trade-offs involved through the different objectives of the 
DAE. Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the work, with an eye to usefully contributing to the 
consultation of the European Commission on the future digital agenda. This final chapter starts from 
the methodology and content of the Commission’s consultation, and builds on the previous chapters, 
underlining the major open questions, and it then advances some tentative conclusions and a few 
policy suggestions. 
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CHAPTER 1|The role of broadband targets 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Broadband Internet has probably been the fastest developing industry in the last two decades. 
From its early development as an experimental network that linked a limited number of computers, 
it has now become one of the key priorities for policy makers around the world, as it is seen as an 
engine for economic growth. Nonetheless, at least in Europe, it is normally left to the market to 
supply Internet connections, via Internet Service Providers (ISPs), such as telecom and cable 
providers. Policy makers have traditionally limited their direct interventions to a few targeted rural 
areas, on top of ensuring a level-playing field among ISPs. 
Perhaps as a way to escape the economic crisis, this discreet approach has changed recently. 
Predictions about the impact of the Internet and broadband infrastructure have been optimistic, 
and sometimes even outlandish. Policy makers expect broadband to lead to job creation and 
economic growth. In the USA, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) launched the National 
Broadband Plan in 2010 in order to improve Internet access. One goal is to provide 100 million 
American households with access to 100 Mbit/s connections by 2020.4 In Europe, broadband is one 
of the pillars of Europe 2020, a ten-year strategy that has been proposed by the European 
Commission. Its Digital Agenda identifies targets that are even more aspirational than the US’s: for 
instance, also by 2020, every European citizen will need access to at least 30 Mbit/s, and at least 
50% of European households should have Internet connections above 100 Mbit/s.5 In the UK, the 
government would like universal coverage of ADSL by 2015, and it is focusing its ‘superfast 
broadband’ efforts on ‘fiber to the node’ technologies.6 Even though ‘superfast’ in the UK is rather 
slower than in countries like Korea, the government hopes that the economic impacts of faster 
broadband speeds will be substantial. Research commissioned by DCMS projects that fast 
broadband could add £17bn to the UK’s annual Gross Value Added by 2024.7 
This chapter looks at the rationale for adopting broadband targets. Clearly, these targets are not 
a goal in themselves but, insofar as they ensure the achievement of some other meaningful goals. 
The major question that needs to be answered relates to the economic impacts of broadband. To 
get a sense of where these economic benefits might come from, we start by looking at the wider 
role of the Internet, and at information and communication technologies (ICTs) in general. 
Broadband Internet, like many other ICTs, is generally considered to be a ‘general purpose 
technology’, in that it functions across many areas of economic and social life, and is an enabler of 
further innovation in those fields.8 The economic analysis of ICTs looks at both direct effects (such as 
the growth of the digital economy and online industries) and indirect effects (on GDP, employment 
and wages, industry structure and the organization of work).9 
2 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BROADBAND 
There are differing views on how ICTs and the Internet shape economic progress. Enthusiasts argue 
that ICT adoption helps to explain the growth in productivity (particularly of labour) in developed 
                                              
4 http://www.broadband.gov/plan/ 
5 http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/our-goals/pillar-iv-fast-and-ultra-fast-Internet-access 
6 https://www.gov.uk/broadband-delivery-uk 
7 SQW (2013).  
8 Bresnahan and Tratjenberg (1995). 
9 OECD (2013). 
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countries. They point to the US experience with computerisation in the 1980s as an illustration of 
what ICT can deliver.10 By contrast, sceptics suggest that these economic effects are overstated, 
and that the Internet, in particular, is far less significant than is often assumed. These critics also 
emphasize the potential for ICTs to increase inequality, and the economic costs of technological 
disruption.11 There is a middle camp between these groups, which assumes that the Internet and 
ICTs contribute to economic change, but that the extent of this change depends on how people and 
firms adapt to, and innovate around, technology. For example, a number of studies suggest that 
ICT investment only delivers productivity gains for firms who also introduce training for staff and 
new ways of working.12 In turn, this perspective suggests that take-up and use of broadband may 
be more important than simply the availability of the technology. It also suggests that the firms 
most likely to gain from broadband may be the most likely to adopt the technology, which creates 
a challenge to assessing the causal impact of broadband (technically, this constitutes an 
endogeneity problem; see further discussion below). 
For firms and their workers, broadband should allow for efficiencies in production, both by 
lowering costs (for data storage, advertising, or working with suppliers), and by enabling 
innovation (reaching new customers online, for instance, or employing big data analytics).13 Those 
productivity gains may translate into higher wages, and possibly into higher levels of employment 
(although firms may well shed staff in response to technological change). At the same time, 
broadband may allow for more flexible patterns of work, including working at home, or on the 
move. For some groups of people, such as those with caring responsibilities, and more flexibility 
may increase labour force participation, which could, in turn, raise employment levels. More 
widely, broadband may lower the barriers to starting a business, particularly in sectors like 
retail.14 
It is also important to recognize that there may be winners and losers from all these changes. If 
broadband makes industries more competitive, some firms will lose staff, or will go out of business 
altogether.15 ICTs, like broadband, are complementary to human capital, so we might also expect 
skilled workers to gain more (in terms of wages). Broadband may also help to accelerate 
automation, which penalises the less skilled workers and those doing routine tasks.16 Increased 
labour force participation may raise overall employment levels, but that increase in the labour 
supply may depress wages – or leave the rates of employment unchanged (if changes in 
participation outweigh the numbers of people moving into work).17 
We should also expect to see broadband having different economic impacts in different types of 
places. Specifically, the academic literature suggests that the absolute economic effects of 
broadband (and of ICTs, in general) may be greater in urban areas. This is because, as discussed 
above, broadband and ICTs enable production complementarities, especially for skilled workers 
and knowledge-intensive firms. Both of these groups are urban-orientated.18 However, for sparser, 
rural areas, broadband provision may still have some economic impact, and could deliver some 
social gains. 
As we said at the beginning, in most countries, broadband infrastructure and service provision are 
market-led: the state’s role is to ensure a competitive market, and to regulate service levels. 
                                              
10 Jorgenson et al. (2008), Oliner et al. (2007). 
11 Gordon (2012 and 2014).  
12 Brynjoloffson and Hitt (2000 and 2003), Bloom et al. (2012). 
13 Bakhshi and Mateos-Garcia (2012). 
14 http://www.retailresearch.org/onlineretailing.php. 
15 Aghion et al. (2009), Moretti (2012).  
16 Bresnahan et al. (2002), Autor et al. (2003), Brynjolffson and McAfee (2014). 
17 Kolko (2012).  
18 Beaudry et al. (2010). 
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Critically, this means that we have relatively few examples of explicit broadband delivery 
programmes, and thus relatively few policy evaluations to draw on. In the EU, State aid rules have 
further limited national governments’ freedom for manoeuvre. This also makes evaluation of 
broadband networks’ economic impacts more challenging than the evaluation of many other areas 
of economic development policy.  
3 EVIDENCE OF BROADBAND IMPACT 
In this chapter, we refer to the findings from the academic literature on the economic effects of 
broadband. As broadband has a very wide set of impacts, we cluster these together, and focus on: 
GDP per capita, productivity, firm entry and the number of businesses, employment, income, and 
wages19.  
We also discuss studies that compare impacts in different places, typically, in urban and rural 
locations. These are the effects that we think are most likely to be of interest to policy makers when 
they are thinking about the potential impact of broadband on local economic performance. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to say as much as we would like about policy design issues, such as 
the relative effects of indirect versus direct provision of broadband; ‘superfast’ versus ‘ultrafast’ 
technologies20; policies that target SMEs, or other types of firms; or scheme costs. This is because 
not many explicit policy evaluations exist, and not all those that do exist are robust enough to pass 
standard academic quality filters.  
Governments around the world increasingly have strong systems to monitor policy input (such as 
spending on subsidized broadband provision) and output (such as the total number of houses or 
business connected to broadband). However, they are less good at identifying policy outcomes 
(such as the wider effect of broadband on local employment). In particular, many government-
sponsored evaluations that look at outcomes do not use credible strategies to assess the causal 
impact of broadband policies. 
By causal impact, the evaluative economics literature means an estimate of the difference that can 
be expected between the outcome for areas undertaking a project (in this case, improving 
broadband provision) and the average outcome they would have experienced without the project. 
Pinning down causality is a crucially important part of impact evaluation. Estimates of the benefits 
of a project are of limited use to policy makers unless those benefits can be attributed, with a 
reasonable degree of certainty, to that project. 
 
3.1 Evidence of  findings by outcome  
GDP per capita. There is one study that looks at the link between GDP per capita and broadband. 
Czernich et al.21 examine the wider effects of broadband on GDP per capita across the OECD 
countries, finding that a 10-percentage point increase in broadband penetration raises national 
annual per capita growth by 0.9-1.5 percentage points. This provides some evidence to back the 
focus of national governments on broadband provision, but it also uses highly aggregated data 
that cannot capture within-country heterogeneity. 
                                              
19 We borrow this distinction from the extensive review of Overman et al. (2015). 
20 A point further dealt with in Chapter 4. 
21 Czernich et al. (2011). 
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Productivity.22 Broadband can positively impact on a firm’s productivity. However, these effects are 
not always positive, they are not necessarily large, and they may depend on complementary 
investment. Productivity effects can vary across different types of workers, with skilled workers 
possibly benefiting more than the unskilled. 
Firm entry and number of businesses.23 Broadband can increase the number of businesses – either 
because it increases firm entry, or because it helps with firms’ survival.  
Employment.24 Broadband can positively impact on local employment. However, the effects are not 
always positive, they are not necessarily large, and they may be offset by population increases 
(leaving unemployment unchanged). Employment effects can vary across different types of areas, 
industries, and workers, with urban areas, service industries and skilled workers possibly benefiting 
more than rural areas, manufacturing industries and unskilled workers. 
Income and wages.25 Broadband can positively impact on local incomes and wages. However, 
effects are not always positive, and they can vary across different types of workers, with the 
highly skilled possibly benefiting more than the low skilled. There are a number of channels through 
which broadband can affect wages and income. Wage effects will depend on the overall effects 
on labour demand and supply (which may, in turn, depend on productivity and other effects). 
Income effects will depend on what happens to wages and employment, as well as on what 
happens to the non-labour market component of incomes. In contrast to employment, we have more 
limited evidence about these effects. Of the five studies that consider either wages or income, two 
find positive effects, one no effect, one finds negative effects, and one reports mixed results. 
Urban versus rural.26 The economic effects of broadband tend to be larger in urban areas, or 
places close to urban areas. 
We emphasise that many of these findings depend on a small number of studies. They are, 
however, consistent with other research on the broader impact of ICTs. 
 
3.2 Lack of  robust evidence.  
Instead, there is a lack of robust evidence in the following areas: 
• Most studies look at the effect of broadband adoption. Very few studies compare 
broadband adoption with coverage/availability. The effects of adoption and simple 
availability may differ considerably. 
• There is surprisingly little evaluation evidence of broadband’s impact on working patterns. 
• Policy evaluations – there is a lack of high quality evaluations of specific broadband 
policies (voucher schemes, direct public provision, or public/private partnerships). This is 
due to few countries having experimented with policies of this kind, which makes their 
evaluation highly conjectural. 
• Firm/sector targeting – there are no studies that evaluate, for instance, SME-targeted 
voucher programmes. 
                                              
22 Akerman et al. (2015), Colombo et al. (2013), Haller and Lyons (2015). 
23 De Stefano et al. (2014), Kandilov et al. (2011), Kim and Orazem (2012), Whitacre et al. (2014a). 
24 Akerman et al. (2015), Dettling (2013), Kolko (2012), Whitacre et al (2014b). 
25 Akerman et al. (2015), Kolko (2012), Whitacre (2014a, b). 
26 Fabritz (2015), Haller and Lyons (2012), Kim and Orazem (2012), Whitacre et al. (2014b). 
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• Direct vs. indirect provision – it would be very useful to know more about the relative 
effects of (say) voucher schemes for broadband services, against direct investment in 
infrastructure.  
• Other Internet technologies – there is a lack of systematic evidence in other areas of 
Internet technology, such as the effect of Wi-Fi networks and fast mobile Internet. Future 
evaluations in this area would greatly improve the evidence base. 
In conclusion, many interesting points remains unanswered, and more studies are needed to assess 
the optimal, or at least the reasonable, approximations to inform policy choices.  
4 THE IMPACT OF DIGITAL TARGETS 
Digital targets are meaningful, in practice, when they are set over and above what the market 
would achieve in the absence of any intervention. They are meaningful economically if they solve 
for a market failure, that is, that there are reasons to believe the market would not supply ‘enough’ 
broadband, yet there are some unexploited welfare gains that society could earn by reaching the 
targets. Unfortunately, there are very few academic papers that manage to assess directly 
whether or not a market failure exists in respect of broadband supply. 
There is one study that explicitly conducts a cost-benefit analysis of the EU Digital Targets, using 
microdata for the UK. Ahlfeldt et al.27 show that some urban areas pass the cost-benefit test of 
current EU policy proposals, while the case for these policy interventions is not very strong in rural 
areas, where, actually, the case is very weak. It is simply too costly to bring fast broadband to 
rural areas, compared to the private benefits it generates. Since, according to the study, it is 
largely the urban areas that pass a cost-benefit test, the question arises: Why do Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) supply sub-optimal speed in those areas where there seems to be a willingness to 
pay that is in excess of costs? The authors’ finding is that the broadband rent goes to the “wrong” 
economic agent. They estimate that there is a meaningful willingness-to-pay for broadband speed, 
and that a faster connection even implies (in a casual way) an increase in the value of a property. 
They show how the broadband speed rent is, in fact, appropriated by the property owners, as 
broadband increases the value of their houses, but not by the ISPs. The ISPs supply broadband 
according to supply and demand conditions in the broadband market, which is largely a 
competitive one. However, these conditions do not necessarily reflect the scarcity of the rents that 
exist in the property market. To upgrade their local networks, ISPs need to recover substantial 
fixed costs (especially for fiber) throughout the relevant catchment area. ISPs can recover these 
fixed costs only in part via the premium prices charged to subscribers, since they are still restrained 
by the competitive landscape. From this perspective, there is a market failure since, despite the 
willingness-to-pay, (some) urban areas end up being undersupplied. 
An implication of these results is that there may be a co-ordination problem among homeowners in 
the undersupplied areas that pass the cost-benefit tests, perhaps because they are unaware or, 
most likely, because of their fragmentation. As with other infrastructures, the co-ordination problem 
therefore rationalizes the public delivery of broadband to undersupplied areas in combination 
with the levies charged to sellers and landlords to recover part of the costs. The political economy 
of the housing-markets’ literature suggests that homeowners and landlords will support such 
initiatives as long as the anticipated capitalization gain exceeds the infrastructure levy.28  
                                              
27 Ahlfeldt at al. (2015) 
28 Fischel (2011), Oates (1969) 
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We note that the study of Ahlfeldt et al.29 only calculates the private benefits from broadband 
supply in residential markets. There may be some externalities that the authors cannot capture with 
their data. Still, as considerable costs exist in the delivery of high-speed networks to rural areas, 
one cannot simply assume that such externalities exist to justify the ubiquitous delivery of 
broadband. Rather, one should try to estimate at least a realistic order of magnitude for such 
externalities, and then see if these externalities can cover the gap between costs and private 
benefits. 
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Do targets have a robust economic rationale? We have provided some evidence of broadband’s 
impacts in several directions, but our first assessment has to be cautious. Additional instruments have 
to be used, or else the impact is likely to be ineffective. Broadband has an impact when employed 
by firms or individuals that have particular characteristics in particular areas, and therefore it is 
difficult to extrapolate broadband’s impact when it is employed by firms or individuals without 
those characteristics, or in different areas. Definitely, there is ample evidence of the heterogeneous 
effects alongside many dimensions. All in all, targets do not therefore seem to have a strong 
economic rationale, especially when applied uniformly across countries that start from very 
different realities. 
We additionally note that, so far, European digital targets have been set uniformly across the 
board, while current levels of adoption and take-up of broadband technologies are very different 
in the various member States. Furthermore, it is evident that countries without a copper legacy 
network have migrated faster towards fiber, if compared with countries where, instead, an existing 
copper-based network was available and could therefore be upgraded in various, and possibly 
cheaper, ways. From this perspective, one would also expect that several economic and 
regulatory approaches would be needed, instead of a single regulatory framework, as has 
often been advocated at the EU level. 
It is much more likely that identical targets across the EU therefore have a political meaning, not an 
economic one. We note that, insofar as the implementation of the targets and how to reach them, 
are not prescriptive, different countries will adopt different degrees of intervention. There is also 
no explicit sanction if a target is not met. While a target may thus look strict on paper, de facto, 
the interpretation and interventions are left to member States. It is possible that this is conceived to 
give a different kind of leverage at the implementation stage, which can take into account the 
heterogeneities as well as the different starting points at the country level. 
An important and possibly dangerous aspect of current EU digital targets that must be 
mentioned in our conclusions, is the regulatory game that they have generated. If targets have 
a political meaning and are set, one way or another, by politicians, the expectation is created that 
politicians will find the resources to meet those targets. This results in a waiting game where ISPs 
do not invest, maybe not even in otherwise profitable areas, since waiting may come with the 
added benefit of receiving public subsidies. There is double risk here: either investment does not 
happen at all, or they follow too late, in the case of scarce public funds; or investment occurs, but 
simply with public money crowding out private investment. In both cases, sub-optimal results for a 
policy that aims to speed broadband coverage and its adoption in Europe. 
                                              
29 Ahlfeldt at al. (2015) 
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CHAPTER 2 |Determinants of fast and ultra-fast 
broadband adoption 
1  INTRODUCTION 
The debate on the evolution of fast- and ultra-fast broadband infrastructure has been largely 
focused on the role of the supply side incentives, mainly the regulatory ones, to boost the 
investment in NGNs. However, the adoption of fast and ultra-fast broadband connections has a 
primary role in regard to the economic outcomes, in general, as well as in the EU scenario. 
Indeed, the Digital Agenda for Europe specifies goals in terms of both network coverage and 
service adoption: The DAE “seeks to ensure that, by 2020, (i) all Europeans have access to much 
higher internet speeds of above 30 Mbps, and (ii) 50% or more of European households subscribe to 
internet connections above 100 Mbps”.30Both these policy goals are strongly interrelated, since 
investment in next generation communications networks (NGN),31 i.e., network coverage, will also 
depend on (expected) adoption, i.e., (future) demand, which, in turn, will be determined by the 
attractiveness of NGN specific services and applications. Only if consumers consider NGN services 
attractive enough, in terms of innovations or quality improvements, when compared with old 
broadband services, will consumers migrate to NGN.  
The so-called “take-up rate”, which relates NGN adoption to NGN coverage, is thus a useful 
indicator of the willingness of consumers to migrate to the new infrastructure. The more consumers 
are satisfied with conventional broadband services, or the more consumers are reluctant to adopt 
new technologies, the greater will be the gap with the newly installed network’s capacity. Clearly, 
a high take-up rate, with adoption being close to capacity in terms of NGN coverage, avoids 
social costs due to over-capacities. 
In Section 2, we first review the existing literature on NGN adoption and its determinants in order 
to provide possible insights into sound policy interventions. In Section 3, we present some graphic 
evidence across EU member States on NGN adoption, coverage and take-up rates highlighting the 
structural differences between EU15 and the Eastern European countries. Next, we present, in 
Section 4, evidence on the existence of network effects on NGN adoption, and on the willingness to 
pay for ultra-fast connections.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although various cost and demand side factors exert an impact on the deployment and adoption 
of NGN, academic research shows that inter alia competition and regulation in the broadband 
markets play a role. It thus makes sense to examine these factors more closely, paying particular 
attention to the demand side issues, i.e., NGN adoption.  
                                              
30 European Commission (2010a) 
31 In this chapter, we consider all available (wireline) FTTx architectures (including fibre-to-the-home and fibre-to-the-building 
(FTTP) as well as hybrid-fibre based on copper and coax infrastructure) as relevant NGN scenarios.  
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Existing empirical literature presents (i) several contributions related to broadband markets, but 
only (ii) a few NGN-related publications. We briefly review both streams of literature in this 
order, below.32  
Regarding point (i), there exist several, but relatively old, papers that study the determinants of 
broadband adoption in both the USA and European countries.33 We summarize, below, their main 
findings.  
Using US data from 2001 to 2004, Denni and Gruber34find that infrastructure-based competition 
has a positive impact on broadband adoption in the longer term, whereas regulatory-induced 
service-based competition has a positive impact only if the number of service-based entrants is not 
too large.  
Non-US-based work mainly refers to OECD country-level data. Bouckaert et al.35 examine the 
determinants of broadband adoption in the years from 2003 to 2008. They find that 
infrastructure-based competition has a positive impact on broadband adoption, whereas service-
based competition is an impediment to adoption. Lee et al.36 analyse the determinants of 
broadband adoption for the years from 2000 to 2008. The authors also show that the presence of 
unbundling obligations has a positive and significant effect on adoption, but they may have a 
negative impact on long-term investment and the broadband saturation level.  
The first paper using EU data is Distaso et al.37, who find that infrastructure-based competition is 
the main driver of broadband adoption, and it plays a more important role than service-based 
competition, especially in the longer term. Höffler38 also examines data for sixteen Western 
European countries for the years from 2000 to 2004. He concludes that broadband deployment 
was predominantly triggered by infrastructure-based competition, with service-based competition 
playing a secondary role. More recently, Nardotto et al.39 employ disaggregated broadband 
data that is related to the old infrastructure for the UK for the quarters from December, 2005, to 
December, 2009. The authors show that unbundling, in the UK, resulted in no increase in 
broadband adoption, but positively affected service quality. 
The above mentioned papers shed some light on the impact of infrastructure-based competition 
and access regulation on standard broadband adoption. Though interesting, they are of limited 
interest, however, for a better understanding of NGN adoption, where the presence of a relatively 
good “legacy” infrastructure may represent a new and relevant constraint on the development of 
NGN’s adoption.  
The papers looking at NGN demand adoption are still very scant. Wallsten and Hausladen40 
estimate the effects of broadband regulations on NGN adoption with data from EU27 countries 
for the years from 2002 to 2007, thus covering the very early market phase. They find that in the 
countries where unbundling is more effective, leading to higher quality broadband and a 
significant penetration experience lower NGN adoption. In this paper, the authors only examine 
                                              
32 For related reviews, the reader is referred to the presentations in in Briglauer, Gugler, Haxhimusa (2015) and Briglauer 
(2014). 
33 Most of this literature is summarized in the report published by the Florence School of Regulation – Communications and 
Media (2011) for the Independent Regulators’ Group. 
34 Denni and Gruber (2007). 
35 Bouckaert et al (2010). 
36 Lee et al. (2011). 
37 Distaso et al. (2006). 
38 Höffler (2007) 
39 Nardotto et al. (2015). 
40 Wallsten and Hausladen (2009). 
18 The future of broadband policy: public targets and private investment 
 
the presence of unbundling regulations, but they do not provide any evidence for the possible 
impact of the unbundling access price on NGN adoption. Samanta et al.41 examine the demand-
side determinants of high-speed broadband deployment using International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) and OECD data for 25 countries, for the years from 1999 to 2009. The authors 
employ a dummy variable to capture the extent of unbundling regulation, and they find that this 
variable has no significant impact. Jeanjean42 investigates the impact of unbundling access charges 
and the share of wholesale access lines to the total number of retail DSL lines, using quarterly data 
covering 15 European countries for the years from 2007 to 2012. The author finds that tight 
copper access regulation diminishes migration to FTTx-based broadband services. More recently, 
Briglauer43 investigates the determinants of NGN adoption for EU27 member States for the years 
from 2004 to 2013. Competitive pressure from mobile networks affects adoption in a non-linear 
manner implying the presence of substantial substitution between fixed and mobile connections. 
Finally, the author also finds evidence for substantial network effects underlying the adoption 
process. 
To summarize, the empirical literature indicates a positive impact of infrastructure-based 
competition on broadband adoption. As regards the impact of infrastructure based and service-
based competition on NGN adoption, the findings are more ambiguous although presenting initial 
evidence on the existence of a relation between the availability of high quality legacy networks 
and the willingness to switch to new NGN services. 
3 EVIDENCE FROM THE EU MEMBER STATES 
Although the main focus of this Section is on NGN adoption (“homes connected”), we also report 
NGN coverage (“homes passed”), i.e., investment related data, since installed capacity represents 
a pre-condition for adoption. The European Commission’s DAE, as well as most national broadband 
plans in member States, simultaneously refer to both targets: adoption and coverage.44 
3.1  NGN Coverage, Adoption and Take-up Rates 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show NGN coverage and NGN adoption for 25 EU ,ember States for the 
years from 2004/2005 to 2014.45 NGN coverage is measured by the total number of lines, 
enabling fast broadband Internet access, which are available to homes or businesses. Network 
coverage thus refers to the number of consumers that, in principle, have access to fast broadband. 
NGN adoption refers to the actual number of NGN subscribers. Figure 1 captures almost the entire 
period of NGN deployment in member States, and it shows that the coverage and the adoption 
follow a more or less dynamic adoption process, which is more pronounced for the former. In 
Figures 1 and 2, the horizontal lines at adoption and coverage values equal to 0.5 (50%) and 1 
(100%), mark the DAE goals. The mean value of fast broadband coverage already equalled 
                                              
41 Samanta et al. (2012). 
42 Jeanjean (2013). 
43 Briglauer (2014). 
44 To clarify the data in this Section we use the following definitions: NGN coverage measures the total number of lines 
deployed, normalized to the total number of households (“homes passed”). Network coverage thus represents the installed 
capacity in physical units, where the term ‘homes passed’ refers to the number of consumers with potential access to NGN 
infrastructure. NGN adoption measures the total number of consumers (normalized to households) who subscribe to at least one 
service offered via the NGN connection on a commercial basis (“homes connected”). NGN take-up rate is the ratio between 
NGN adoption and NGN coverage and thus ranges continuously in the interval [0;1] as adoption cannot be higher than 
installed capacity. 
45 Source: FTTH Council Europe/Briglauer, Cambini, Grajek (2015). Data for Malta, Cyprus and Croatia are excluded. The 
FTTx coverage for Luxembourg was 2.31 in 2014, which was not reported, because we have restricted the presentation to an 
upper-boundary of 2 for illustrative purposes. 
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approximately 100% in 2014, which, on average, fulfils goal (i) for the 25 member States in our 
analysis. Ultra-fast broadband coverage, however, is much lower, with an average mean value of 
only about 35 % (Figure 2). 
Nevertheless, there appears to be a substantial gap in adoption rates. The average NGN 
adoption rates for fast broadband and ultra-fast broadband are only 25% and 10%, 
respectively.  
Overall, when comparing fast broadband deployment, in terms of coverage and adoption, with 
ultra-fast broadband, one finds similar growth patterns, but notably lower levels for the latter in 
most of the EU States. In some countries, what is referred by the European Commission as ultra-fast 
broadband deployment has started on very small scale or not at all. Instead, operators focus on 
hybrid technologies to upgrade traditional copper and coaxial cable technologies. In general, 
according to available data, it can be concluded that present DAE targets are not yet reached.46 
Furthermore, the gap between adoption and coverage is still huge and differentiated among the 
EU’s founding members and Eastern European countries. In Figure 3 we also report the evolution of 
NGN adoption, coverage and take-up rate in EU27 as an average across countries.  
                                              
46 Briglauer, Cambini, Grajek, (2015). As regards the coverage goal (i), reported NGN coverage data overestimates the 
actual coverage and adoption because of double counting in many Member States. In particular, in urban areas, there is 
double counting of homes passed by cable television operators and traditional telecommunications operators. In addition, 
business establishments, which promise high returns, may passed by in parallel with NGN infrastructures. This explains why the 
coverage levels in Figures 1 and 2 sometimes exceed 100 percent. 
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FIGURE 1: FTTX BROADBAND COVERAGE AND ADOPTION RATES PER HOUSEHOLD IN EU25 
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FIGURE 2: FTTP BROADBAND COVERAGE AND ADOPTION RATES PER HOUSEHOLD IN EU25 
 
 The evidence suggests that while coverage seems to present a similar trend across the EU countries 
(although EU15 countries mostly deploy hybrid FTTC connections, while Eastern countries use mostly 
high-end FTTB/H connections), the adoption and the take-up rates of NGN services are greater in 
Eastern European countries, where the presence of the “old” legacy (copper based) infrastructure is 
limited, or even absent. In turn, conventional broadband services enjoy broad consumer acceptance 
in terms of their quality characteristics and the high market saturation in the EU15 countries. As a 
consequence, consumer demand may also be subject to substantial switching costs which is not, or is 
only to a limited extent, the case in Eastern European countries with much lower levels of basic 
broadband penetration (see the discussion in Section 3.2). The higher market saturation, in terms of 
per household or per capita adoption of broadband services is, the lower the remaining segment 
of consumers who can be directly migrate to NGN services without having to overcome switching 
costs47. 
FIGURE 3: NGN COVERAGE, ADOPTION AND TAKE-UP RATE IN EU27 (SOURCE: BRIGLAUER, 
CAMBINI AND MELANI, 2015) 
 
 
3.2  Broadband adoption 
Although the related empirical literature suggests that EU broadband access regulations have been 
only partly successful in facilitating infrastructure investment and infrastructure-based competition,48 
the EU regulatory framework should not be judged as being ineffective, especially in international 
comparisons and in respect of the adoption of basic broadband technologies. Table 1 shows that 
all of the OECD countries have experienced a similar pattern of growth in basic wireline 
broadband subscriptions between 2009 and 2014. Countries are ranked, according to their 
broadband adoption in 2014, in descending order. The major western European economies, 
                                              
47 Briglauer (2014).  
48 The reader is referred to Cambini and Jiang (2009), who review the older and first-generation broadband related 
literature on investment and regulation, and to Briglauer, Frübing and Vogelsang (2015, section 3.2) who review the NGN 
related literature. See also the recent analysis on migration from copper to fibre networks (Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan, 
2012, 2014). 
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including France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which are comparable to the 
USA in their levels of economic development, do much better in terms of basic broadband 
adoption. The Scandinavian countries, which have a long tradition of public subsidies for 
broadband and a high level of consumer ICT-affinity49, also beat the USA and Japan in the 
rankings.  
Overall, the EU access regulations seem to have worked relatively well in facilitating broadband 
adoption by consumers on the basis of the old (copper and coaxial-based) broadband 
infrastructure.  
Moreover, on the demand side, there is still significant uncertainty about the willingness of 
consumers to pay for new broadband services50. Since the regulatory approach to legacy 
networks has been, by and large, extended to the NGN, we expect underinvestment in NGN in the 
EU, especially in relation to ultra-fast broadband, which then also carries over to FTTH/B 
adoption.51   
                                              
49 Briglauer and Gugler (2013). 
50 Dot.Econ (2012); see also below in Section 3.2. 
51 Briglauer, Cambini, Grajek (2015). 
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TABLE 1: TOTAL WIRELINE BASIC BROADBAND SUBSCRIPTIONS PER 100 INHABITANTS52 (IN 
BOLD THE EU MEMBER STATES) 
OECD country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Switzerland 35.60 38.19 40.25 42.58 45.24 48.89 
Denmark 36.17 37.23 37.62 38.83 40.21 41.32 
Netherlands 37.09 38.10 38.93 39.72 40.44 40.62 
France 30.65 32.78 34.68 36.40 37.65 39.23 
Norway 33.87 34.53 35.22 36.22 36.95 38.65 
Korea 33.24 34.80 35.88 36.50 37.47 38.03 
Iceland 32.82 33.65 34.48 34.81 35.77 36.82 
United Kingdom 29.67 31.47 33.01 34.26 35.56 36.78 
Belgium 28.87 30.84 32.14 33.28 34.39 35.95 
Germany 30.46 31.91 33.24 34.06 34.84 35.90 
Canada 29.59 30.70 31.70 32.42 33.47 35.37 
Sweden 31.63 31.92 31.97 32.22 32.74 33.84 
Luxembourg 29.18 30.72 31.50 32.11 32.52 33.68 
Finland 28.73 28.58 30.08 30.97 31.54 32.19 
New Zealand 22.83 24.85 26.61 28.78 30.20 31.62 
United States 25.50 26.72 27.70 28.72 29.69 31.43 
Greece 17.12 20.18 22.14 24.21 26.23 28.71 
Japan 24.71 26.56 27.27 27.67 28.04 28.52 
Czech Republic 12.91 14.55 15.78 16.63 17.38 28.34 
OECD - Total 22.96 24.39 25.36 26.11 26.96 28.20 
Estonia 22.46 23.28 24.76 24.54 25.49 28.20 
Australia 22.99 24.00 24.15 24.83 25.99 27.66 
Spain 21.31 23.36 24.48 24.65 26.31 27.62 
Austria 21.10 22.90 24.22 25.00 26.15 27.55 
Ireland 19.18 20.64 21.71 22.65 24.43 27.28 
Portugal 17.75 19.78 21.11 22.59 24.12 27.24 
Slovenia 21.53 22.81 23.75 24.40 25.11 26.73 
Hungary 17.81 19.56 20.92 21.88 23.07 26.16 
Israel 23.47 23.86 24.20 24.70 25.12 25.33 
Italy 20.02 21.58 22.11 22.13 22.27 23.64 
Slovakia 11.58 12.79 13.83 14.77 15.63 21.98 
Poland 12.83 13.82 14.90 15.71 15.64 17.99 
Chile 9.71 10.40 11.58 12.38 13.00 13.96 
Turkey 8.85 9.73 10.25 10.49 11.19 11.56 
Mexico 8.39 9.81 10.33 10.62 11.28 10.72 
  
                                              
52 Source: OECD (oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband). Note: based on total population; subscriptions with ≥ 256 kbit/s download 
speed.  
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4 ECONOMICS EFFECTS UNDERLYING NGN ADOPTION 
Understanding the key drivers of NGN adoption is extremely important from a policy perspective 
so as to boost fiber connections among EU citizens and to increase the take-up rates throughout the 
EU. In this section, we provide quantitative evidence on two issues that appear to be of particular 
interest, in our opinion:  
• the value of network externalities in fiber adoption. We want to answer the question: Is NGN 
adoption subject to path dependency? Does early adoption of fiber connections motivate other 
consumers to adopt the same technology, facilitating migration? 
• Consumers’ willingness to pay for very high speed connections. While it is clear that all fiber 
connections with ultra-fast speeds can offer a higher quality than the copper-based services, 
would this automatically imply that, on average, the demand side of the market has a 
willingness to pay for these products? 
 
 
4.1  Network ef fects in ultra-fast broadband connection 
Network effects represent a special type of externality that underlies the adoption of 
broadband/NGN services, in the case where the number of subscribers (and/or producers) has an 
impact on the consumers’ utility (firms’ profit). In general, increases in the adoption rates also lead 
to increases in the usage intensity of the respective services53. 
Consumers’ utility can be related to the possibility of communicating with one another at the 
consumer level, either directly, e.g., via different online platforms, or indirectly, in the case of 
network effects occurring at different producer levels. For instance, the more users subscribe to 
(high-speed) Internet services, the more specific content and related applications will be 
programmed, which increases the consumers’ utility and willingness to adopt such (NGN) services. 
The same is true for the development of related hardware and electronic equipment. Furthermore, 
it is likely that the NGN adoption process is subject to learning spill overs, inasmuch as the value 
added to NGN services appears to be a priori unknown to potential consumers, whose valuation, 
inter alia, depends on the information gathered by the already-existing subscriber base54. 
Operators simply benefit from the network size, since an increase in the total number of subscribers 
lowers the average costs significantly, in view of the NGN topology, and this thus increases the 
profits. Network effects give rise to a self-propelling endogenous growth process, which suggests 
that the contemporaneous and previous NGN adoption rates are positively related: the higher the 
existing subscriber base, the higher the potential network benefits. 
Few papers address the existence of network externalities in broadband adoption. A first set of 
papers deals with standard broadband service adoption; the second one specifically accounts for 
broadband take up in fiber infrastructures. 
In the first set of papers, we can mention Bouckaert et al.55, Lee and Lee56, and Lin and Wu57. 
Although not directly related to fiber adoption, they may provide interesting evidence on the 
existence of network externalities and on their values.  
                                              
53 Grajek and Kretschmer (2009). 
54 Grajek (2010). 
55 Bouckaert et al. (2010). 
56 Lee and Lee (2010). 
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Bouckaert et al.58 and Lee and Lee59, using data from the OECD countries, found that the 
penetration in the previous time period significantly and positively affects current broadband 
penetration. The former study suggested that the result verifies the positive persistence of 
penetration over time, while the latter suggested that it is a positive network effect, indicating that 
a higher current subscriber number attracts more subscribers in the future. In Bouckaert et al.60 the 
estimated coefficient for lagged penetration is 0.96. No matter what the explanation is, these 
studies confirm the positive significant effect of previous broadband penetration, and this result 
reveals that a higher penetration in the current year results in a higher penetration in the following 
year. 
Lin and Wu61 study the determinants of broadband diffusion for a longer period, from 1997 to 
2009. In this analysis, the dependent variable is broadband penetration, measured as the total of 
fixed broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants (in log), and the broadband technologies 
adopted by the subscribers include DSL, cable, fiber, satellite, and fixed wireless. The analysis 
shows that the estimated parameters of lagged broadband penetration ranges between 0.25-
0.54. This implies that a 1% increases in previous broadband subscribers generates, everything 
being equal, a positive effect on future subscribers that is equal to ~0.2-0.5%. 
The only paper that analyses the presence of a network externality effect on fiber adoption is one 
by Briglauer62. Based on an unbalanced panel of the EU27 member States for the years from 
2004 to 2012, the paper identifies the most important determinants of the adoption of fiber-
based broadband services. In this paper, the author determines what is called the ‘speed of 
diffusion of fiber adoption’. This index is expressed as the percentage of the gap between the 
long-run (desired or target) stock of fiber subscribers, and the subscribers in the previous period, 
which is closed in each period. In some sense, considering the dynamic nature of the analysis, the 
author determines a sort of long-term trend of adoption that is relevant to evaluating network 
externalities. Briglauer’s results63show that the estimated coefficient for the previous period’s fiber 
users lies in the range between 0.56-0.78 with a median value of 0.70. This result implies that the 
speed of diffusion of fiber is equal to 1 – 0.70 = 0.30. This result has the following interpretation: 
the gap between the average number of fiber connections per household and the DAE target 
value (0.5) is covered with an increase of 30% per year. 
In sum, we can conclude that the existing evidence confirms the presence of considerable network 
externalities. From a policy perspective, this also implies that, whenever possible, it will be 
important to incentivize migration to NGN services in order to generate some positive feedback to 
further increase adoption and, in turn, the take-up rates. 
4.2  Will ingness to pay for  ultra-fast  connections: some evidence 
It is rather difficult to predict and estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) of consumers for very 
high-speed connections. Clearly, high-speed connections deliver better performances than 
traditional basic broadband services and this in turn would imply that on average the willingness to 
pay for this product differentiation should be larger. 
                                                                                                                                               
57 Lin and Wu (2013). 
58 Bouckaert et al. (2010). 
59 Lee and Lee (2010). 
60 Bouckaert et al. (2010). 
61 Lin and Wu (2013). 
62 Briglauer (2014). 
63 Briglauer (2014). 
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Unfortunately, there exist only a few economic documents that present robust analysis of the 
willingness to pay for migrating from copper to fiber connections, i.e., in estimating the so called 
“fiber premium”. Most of this evidence suggests that customers are likely to have a high 
incremental WTP for a high-speed service, but a low incremental WTP for a very high-speed 
service. 
Using data from a nationwide US survey that was administered during late 2009/early 2010, 
Rosston et al.64 estimate a random utility model of household preferences for broadband Internet 
services, offering different grades of speed (slow, fast and very fast). Results showed that the 
representative household has a high marginal WTP for a high-speed Internet service, but a low 
marginal WTP for a very high speed service. Quoting the authors, “the representative household is 
willing to pay $20 per month for more reliable service, $45 for an improvement in speed from ‘slow’ 
to ‘fast’, and $48 for an improvement in speed from ‘slow’ to ‘very fast’.” This implies that  a 
representative household is willing to pay a relatively higher premium for an upgrade in 
broadband speed from a “slow” service to a “fast” broadband service, but only a small additional 
premium of US$3 per month for an upgrading from a fast to a ‘very fast’ service. 
A study65 based on data from a web-based survey of 3600 respondents in the Netherlands, in 
2010, showed that having a fiber connection that leads to symmetrical upload and download 
speeds appears to have limited appeal, given current bandwidth demand, and enjoys only a 
limited price premium of around 8%-15%, or around €5 in absolute terms. 
Similarly, a 2011 document from the German regulator (Bundesnetzagentur)66  reports that 
customers are prepared to spend around €5/month for greater bandwidth.  
This premium for fibre is considered to be relatively modest – at least in the EU scenario – with 
respect to what is needed to spur consumers’ migration from copper to fibre infrastructure. A 
document by WIK-Consult67, prepared for ECTA i.e. the association of entrant telecoms operators 
in Europe, shows that the fiber premium, i.e. consumers’ willingness to pay, appears insufficient to 
sustain wide-spread fiber investment. 
Evidence from New Zealand provides further insights. In the Colmar Brunton report68, prepared on 
behalf of the infrastructure operator, Chorus, the WTP for ultra-fast connections for 23% of 
consumers is above NZ$20/month higher than for DSL, but for 26% of consumers, it is lower than 
NZ$20/month. On average, the estimated WTP is NZ$20.70/month, around 12.3€/month. These 
values slightly increase for small businesses, whose WTP ranges between NZ$22.10/month and 
NZ$25.10/month (i.e., €14-15.5/month).  
The Commerce Commission also conducted its own demand side study69 on WTP for fiber services. 
The Commission found that only 4% of respondents were willing to pay more than NZ$20/month 
and that most respondents were willing to pay between NZ$5-10/month (i.e., 3-6€/month). 
However, the study also revealed that the speed requirements for services are increasing rapidly, 
so that higher WTP differences can be expected in the next few years. 
                                              
64 Rosston et al. (2010). 
65 Van Camp (2012). 
66 Bundesnetzagentur (2011). 
67 WIK (2011). 
68 Colmar Brunton report(2012)See: 
https://www.google.co.nz/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCEQFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2
Fwww.chorus.co.nz%2Ffile%2F50475%2FIntegrated-Fibre-Research-Chorus-Connections---Final-5th-
Dec.pptx&ei=LDz2VMOpJqTcmAW3toC4BA&usg=AFQjCNE5GjYZ1xCvUc7V02PfSnbRcJW_cA&bvm=bv.87269000,d.dGY 
69 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/regulated-industries/telecommunications/monitoring-reports-and-studies/studies/ 
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Overall, the literature above indicates that WTP is low, in particular for very-high speed 
broadband services. This is in line with the evidence in Figure 2, which indicates the low adoption of 
ultra-fast broadband services in most EU countries. The main exceptions relate to the Eastern 
European economies, which are subject to a less pronounced replacement effect on the supply side, 
as well as substantially lower switching costs on the demand side, due to the absence of a well-
established high-quality fast broadband infrastructure. 
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Major EU member States do not fare badly compared to other OECD countries, especially US and 
Japan, considering present broadband adoption. Moreover, DAE targets in terms of fast 
broadband coverage have been reached on average. However adoption rates, after a first surge, 
are now lagging behind coverage in terms of fast broadband and, even more, in terms of ultra-
fast broadband. 
The literature has begun to uncover the theoretical and empirical aspects and trade-offs of the 
relationship between the regulation of the legacy network and NGN adoption. Evidence also exists 
that infrastructure-based competition stemming from wireline or wireless operators, has a positive 
effect on the latter. Furthermore, the adoption of fiber connections appears to be characterized by 
path dependency, and this implies that policies aimed at fostering retail migration will be 
important in sustaining demand expansion.  
In view of the dynamic interaction of supply and demand, a proverbial chicken-and-egg 
situation gives rise to a co-ordination problem: it is not clear a priori whether there has to be 
demand for new, attractive, and bandwidth hungry services in advance, in order to promote 
the deployment of new communications infrastructure, or whether those services and 
applications will automatically evolve after the necessary infrastructure has been put in place. 
The Internet history indicates that the development of content and applications usually follows 
infrastructure deployment, e.g. there would be none of the Web 2.0 services and social platforms 
available in a world with narrowband dial-up Internet infrastructure. This view may suggest that 
the goals of the DAE can be best reached if NGN deployment is concentrated primarily on the 
supply side, either by means of State-aid policies targeted to supply unprofitable (“white”) areas 
or via favourable competitive market conditions as in case of Eastern European countries which did 
not exhibit the presence of a ubiquitous basic broadband legacy network.  
A key issue, however, is the permanence of a relevant gap in willingness to pay between fast and 
ultra-fast broadband connections, since current evidence suggests an extremely low customers’ 
interest to pay, presently evaluated in around 4-6€/month. Moreover, it is also likely that without 
increased adoption a supply side policy risks to increase over-capacity and underutilization of 
networks. 
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CHAPTER 3 | Technological neutrality, targets, and 
competition objectives  
1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the often repeated principles of the European Regulatory Framework (ERF) is that it 
embodies technological neutrality.70 It was introduced explicitly in the 2002 Framework, as a  
desirable rather than as an essential feature. This can be seen as a continuation of the European 
Commission’s previous approach, which in essence was that it was best to leave technology choice 
to industry and not to try to choose a technology winner. In the past there were exceptions to this 
approach, which allowed the promotion of specific services where it was warranted. In practice this 
might be read as allowing it only where industry has already reached a conclusion on that 
technology which is the best or where other exceptional circumstances might arise.71 
A more recent innovation is the use of quantitative targets, such as those embedded in the digital 
single market objectives. Such targets have the potential to impinge on all aspects of sector to 
which they apply. This phenomenon is most evident in the case of activities, which are non-
marketed, where output targets play the key role in determining what is produced. The two classic 
examples of this are centrally planned economies such as that operating in the Soviet Union before 
about 1990, and the non-marketed public sector of almost any economy. In both cases, targets 
and performance indicators drive production decisions, leading to a skewing of effort towards 
activities covered by and rewarded by the incentive system.  
In the case of broadband – the subject matter of this chapter – targets play an exhortatory rather 
than a decisive role; failure to meet them is not expressly associated with punishment or loss of 
benefit. They are also superimposed upon the operation of a market in which firms pursue their 
own commercial incentives. However, this does not preclude the use of regulation to influence the 
attainment of targets. Thus, as noted below, different varieties of fiber network are suited in 
different ways to promote ‘fast’ broadband (conventionally with speeds of 30 Mbits per second), 
and ‘ultrafast’ broadband (with speeds of 100 Mbits per second and above). We can assume that 
the underlying reasoning for distinguishing broadband as a suitable activity for targeting is that, 
as a general purpose technology itself, or as a component of the general purpose technology 
consisting of information and communications technology, broadband has a wide and general 
positive effect on the EU’s economic development (on this refer to chapter 1). Moreover the scale 
of that effect may depend on the nature of the service provided, especially its speed.   
However, other objectives than target attainment can be influenced by the form of broadband 
regulation. In particular, it seems that the nature and extent of infrastructure competition among 
providers is significantly affected by the form of access regulation adopted. Accordingly, the 
purpose of this chapter is to raise some fundamental questions about the desirability of TN in the 
specific context of the current review of the European regulatory framework and the technological 
and other choices presently facing policy makers. Although mobile broadband is of increasing 
importance, the focus here is fixed broadband, which is usually regarded as being the more 
problematic mode of supplying connectivity because it requires more intrusive regulation than does 
                                              
70 In a way this is slightly surprising, since an earlier much acclaimed triumph of the European telecommunications model was 
the worldwide domination of GSM, the mobile standard adopted in 1987, which imposed a single and therefore non-neutral 
technology for 2G mobile, which was compulsory in Europe and which later conquered the world.  
 
71 It should be noted that the significance of technological neutrality and its interpretation in Europe is evolving over time. 
Numerical observations show that mentions of TN have been declining in speeches by all EU Commissioners in charge of 
Electronic Communications in the past 15 years. In the case of Commissioner Oettinger the trend appears confirmed, even if 
may be too soon to tell.  
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its mobile complement and rival. Thus section 2 examines what TN means in this context and asks 
whether it is subject to being over-ridden on market failure or other grounds.  
The subsequent sections 3-4 examine two issues in the application of TN to fixed broadband:  the 
issue of whether fiber should be provided by fiber to the premises (FTTP), or by fiber to the 
cabinet (FTTC or vDSL), a technology which continues to rely on the incumbent’s copper and which 
may limit certain forms of competition; and the choice of technology within FTTP between the so-
called point to point (P2P) or point to multi-point (PMP) variants.72  
Section 5 contains conclusions, which can be summarised as saying that policy makers and 
regulators should consider technological neutrality as a means to the end of consumer welfare not 
an end in itself, but they should also be wary to blithely or carelessly overrule firms’ technological 
choices. 
2 WHAT IS TN AND WHEN SHOULD IT BE PURSUED? 
Maxwell and Bourreau73 helpfully distinguish three meanings of TN. First, technology neutrality 
means that technology standards are designed to limit negative externalities, such as radio 
interference or pollution, in a minimally intrusive way. As so often happens, this is normally best 
achieved by regulating outputs rather than inputs – i.e., policy makers should describe the result to 
be achieved, but they should leave companies free to adopt whatever technology they find most 
appropriate in order to achieve the desired result.  
A second interpretation of TN is simply that the same regulatory principles should apply, 
regardless of the technology used. Regulations should thus acknowledge convergence and avoid 
treating similar services in different ways. This is well exemplified in approaches to spectrum 
management, which prohibit the inclusion in spectrum licensing of terms which mandate the use of 
particular technologies. The same idea was included in the provisions of the 2009 Better 
Regulation Directive74, which offered mobile operators more freedom in their choice of technology 
– clearly a complete reversal of the rigid approach that had been adopted in the GSM 
Directive.75  All of this must be distinguished from the much stronger notion of service neutrality, 
which will allow a licensee to switch the service produced, for example, from broadcasting to 
mobile communications, which is far more likely to lead to interference problems. 
The third and final interpretation is that TN is a protection against seeking to nudge the market in 
a direction which is considered desirable by policy makers or regulators. In essence, policy makers 
should not try to pick technology winners and leave this to market forces.    
The specific reference to TN in the ERF deserves to be reported in full, as it describes technology 
neutrality as being ‘desirable’, but it suggests that, sometimes, promoting a specific technology can 
be justified: “The requirement for Member States to ensure that national regulatory authorities take 
the utmost account of the desirability of making regulation technologically neutral, that is to say that it 
neither imposes nor discriminates in favour of the use of a particular type of technology, does not 
preclude the taking of proportionate steps to promote certain specific services where this is justified, 
for example, digital television as a means for increasing spectrum efficiency.” 76 
Most statements on the merits of competition - and of limiting public opportunities to intervene in 
well-functioning, or effectively competitive, markets - emphasise the importance of decentralising 
the choice of technology for those organisations which (i) are likely to have the best information 
                                              
72 A longer version of this paper discusses the history, since 2003, of neutrality in the regulation of cable and 
telecommunications companies.  
73 Maxwell and Bourreau (2015). 
74 European Parliament and the Council (2009a). 
75 For an optimistic review of the consequences of this Directive, see Pelkmans (2001). 
76 European Parliament and Council (2009b), Recital 18. 
The future of broadband policy: public targets and private investment 31 
 
about it at their disposal, and (ii) have, by virtue of carrying the can for any poor choice, the 
strongest incentive to make the right choice. These are, of course, the firms in the marketplace and 
their financiers, rather than government officials or regulators. 
However, there is a corollary to this reasoning. If there is any reason to suppose (1) that TN itself 
will lead to market failure (due, for instance, to the externalities or the abridgement of 
competition), or (2) that overwhelming non-standard policy objectives apply in relation to the 
activities in question, then the general presumption in favour of TN may be rebutted. Examples of 
this second kind may involve, in some jurisdictions, industrial or protectionist policies that are 
pursued by favouring, whether openly or covertly, national or regional technologies. This occurred 
in relation to GSM for Europe; it has been observed in the nuclear power industry, for example, 
where successful demonstration projects can be seen to provide a springboard for subsequent 
overseas sales. The justification, if any, for such interventions often hinges upon highly specific 
circumstances, and they are not considered further here.  
More pertinently, the pursuit of broadband targets may influence technological choice, via the 
means of regulation. The current European targets relate both to ‘fast’ and to ‘ultrafast’ 
broadband. They thus avoid, at least to some degree, the well-known phenomenon associated with 
partial targeting - that the targeted objectives dominate those that are not covered by targets. In 
this sense, the present targets do not appear to violate TN, even indirectly. However, we note that, 
by construction, the same broadband targets presently apply to all member States, whatever their 
starting points. These uniform targets, applied to different conditions, may, in themselves, locally 
violate TN, but isolating their impact is probably an insoluble problem, as what we have observed 
is the combined effect of too many factors.  
Further, we want to focus below on possible ways in which departures from TN could relate to 
hypothetical market failures in the context of fixed broadband deployment. The two major sources 
of market failure that may be relevant here are the positive externalities and the consequences of 
the abridgement of competition. 
(1) Externalities77  
We have noted above that, in the case of spectrum use, producer- to- producer negative 
externalities can occur, mainly through interference. In the case of fixed broadband, the more 
plausible externalities that ‘explain’ the existence of targets, however, are likely to be indirect 
“positive” effects of the following kinds: 
• Enhanced speed and quality of information flows: it is sometimes suggested that the 
combination of more information processing and faster communications are necessary to 
deliver the benefits, with one alone producing less spectacular results. 
• Better access to markets: due to lower barriers to entry, an increase in the geographical 
scope of markets (the “death of distance”), better job matching, better access to customers 
via the Web, etc..  
• New business processes and organizational structures: better stock control, quicker 
contracting, just-in-time production, etc.. 
• More innovation, in general: this is made possible by the availability of new 
communications services; examples can be multiplied – social networks being a particularly 
significant one.  
However, in a discussion of TN, the key question is not the existence or relevance of general 
broadband externalities, which by now are quite well established, but it is whether these benefits 
are available in different degrees from different technologies. One needs to ascertain if, and how 
                                              
77 The general theme of broadband externalities was discussed in Chapter 1.  
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much, of such benefits depend, for example, on the speed and other characteristics of the 
broadband service produced by each technology, and the speed and cost with which the 
technologies can be applied. This is not an easy task. 
(2) Market power 
The second form of market failure may arise via a chain of reasoning which links different fixed 
broadband technologies, the potential which they carry for either competition or, alternatively, the 
abuse of market power, and the remedies adopted by the regulator to counteract the expected 
detriments. 
It is worth noting that European regulators have a clear history of deliberately seeking to influence 
the competitive outcomes in broadband markets by regulatory interventions, mainly through the 
design of access products and their pricing: this is shown by the preference for outcomes which 
favour infrastructure competition and ‘ladder of investment’ strategies.78  
However, what is unusual in the current decision process is that, according to some versions of the 
story, regulators are not so much choosing as, often, being forced to accept technological 
evolutions, which increasingly run the risk of restricting their ability to effectively influence access 
choices.79 In conclusion, regulation and competition law are normally called o apply their 
consolidated instruments to control such problems, nonetheless, this may create a potential for 
distorted technological choices. Here, we are not interested in the motives of the parties. Our 
concern is whether the ‘competition effect’ of technological choice is reasonably foreseeable. If it is, 
then it may pose a TN dilemma.  
3 FIBRE TO THE PREMISES VS. COPPER UPGRADES 
 
In the next two sections, we discuss the possibilities and risks for particular technological choices in 
the field of fixed broadband through two case studies. Fiber to the premises vs. copper upgrades  
The first case study considered here combines both importance and topicality. The debate in many 
member States concerns the major question about whether the dominant form of fiber in the near 
future should be fiber to the premises (FTTP), or fiber to the cabinet (FTTC). The latter can be 
characterised as a ‘cheap and cheerful’ version of the former – it is considerably less expensive 
and more rapid to install, but is not capable of the same speeds or other quality parameters as 
those of FTTP. There are interesting intermediate stages between the two: one of which is the 
technology known as G.fast, which takes the fiber closer to, but not right up to, the premises – for 
example, to a telephone pole close to the house.  
One feature of FTTC and G.fast that has been the object of considerable debate is that, 
differently from FTTP, in the former, the incumbent continues to provide access to the last elements 
of copper, remaining the owner of an essential facility bottleneck indispensable to its competitors. 
Here however, we do not want to ask which mode of FTTx is better in which parts of which country. 
Instead, we ask the much more limited question: is it reasonably foreseeable that FTTC generates a 
different market structure from FTTP. 
In one version, the contrasting strategic choices made by NRAs illustrate how regulation can 
override technological neutrality. Figure 1 (below) shows the powerful position which FTTC has 
                                              
78 Cave (2014). 
79 An important background consideration here is that, in the presence of dominance/SMP, the best technological choice for a 
firm maybe at odds with that which would emerge in a competitive market, since the incentives faced by a dominant firm 
differ from those of a competitive firm. European regulators, in market reviews since 2002, have uniformly found that SMP 
exists in [each, and] the European physical access market, and they have adopted remedies to curb it. 
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achieved in some European countries. Within this overall picture, it is possible to make a 
comparison between Belgium, Germany and the UK, on one hand, where FTTC has predominated, 
and France, Portugal and Spain, on the other, where FTTP may have predominated.80 It must also 
be acknowledged that there may be features peculiar to the individual countries that may have 
slanted the operators’ choice in particular directions. However, we are not interested in why the 
operators did what they did, but only in whether their different approaches have generated 
different competition outcomes and their eventual consequences for TN.  
The FTTC approach is a relatively straightforward extension of the existing regulatory copper 
regime, by now well known to the EU and the NRAs - subject to the major difference that the key 
access product switched from unbundled loops to sub-loops for copper, and to bitstream or VULA 
for fiber. 
The FTTP approach was much more distinct:  
1. Virtual access was signalled to be unavailable on FTTP infrastructure into the future, at 
least in urban areas. In practice, this meant that once copper network capacity was 
overtaken by fiber, entrants would not survive on unbundled loops. Spain was the 
exception, because it did grant access to the fiber network, but capped that capacity at 
copper performance. France indicated that it was too early, and Portugal also proposed 
to deal with it ‘later’.  
2. Significant emphasis was placed on ensuring that access to passive network elements (ducts, 
trenching, etc.) was best in class, and that a symmetrical regime existed to deal with in-
building access to cabling, etc.. 
3. An urban–rural divide was central to the approach; and thus, while urban areas were 
subject to the ‘build your own’ approach, indicated above, rural areas had a much easier 
access regime. While Portugal went for a straight urban/rural geographic segmentation, 
France opted for a division based on building density, but the net impact was essentially 
the same.  
As noted earlier, in the absence of a strong policy preference in relation to technology 
parameters, the strategic choice, established with the 2009 NGA Recommendation, giving FTTC 
‘NGA’ status on an equal footing to FTTP, coincided with network operators in several countries 
preferring to invest in upgrading copper i.e., in FTTC. This can be observed in Figure 1 below. 
                                              
80 Cave and Shortall (2011) argue that this divergence may have been due, in part, to the somewhat troublesome and lengthy 
gestation period of the European Commission’s 2010 NGA Recommendation. While the final version has essentially endorsed 
the FTTC approach, the 2008 first draft proposed that NGA regulation should rely on good access to passive infrastructure, in 
order to facilitate competitive network build-out; this would be accomplished by discouraging copper upgrades relative to 
FTTP, and limiting virtual access products for third parties to rural areas ,where competitive networks were unlikely. See also 
Shortall and Cave (2015). 
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By 2014, the proportion of homes passed by FTTC in Belgium, Germany and the UK, and by FTTP 
in Portugal and Spain, had reached 60-90%, the figure for France was much lower at 20%. 81 A 
significant difference between the two cases can be seen in Figure 2, which shows that the 
regulatory strategy employed in the FTTP countries (a strong version of the conventional ‘ladder of 
investment’, combined with symmetric regulation of in-building wiring), is associated with an 
appreciably more equal split of homes supplied between the incumbent, on one hand, and 
competitive providers, on the other, than is the case in FTTC countries.82 Not surprisingly, this makes 
this approach very palatable to competitive providers with deep pockets.83On the other hand, 
FTTC countries have shown a more rapid deployment of NGN resulting among the ones with a 
higher percentage of households served by fast broadband services. 
In those countries that have adopted FTTH, policy makers put in place extensive sharing regimes 
for passive outside-plant infrastructures, such as ducts or cabling, and very extensive in-building 
wiring sharing regimes. These were co-ordinated by the regulator, and extensive industry co-
ordination took place. This was further backed by measures to ensure FTTH extended to rural 
areas, normally with public finance to support the measures - either now, or with a clear path in the 
future.84  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
81 Note that the data on Germany in Figure 2 may overestimate the ‘altnet’ element, since the vDSL is essentially only 
deployed on those lines where SLU is also LLU. 
82  However, it should be considered, that the competitive picture represented in figure 2 would appear quite different if one 
would have also taken into consideration the presence and technological choices of cable companies. A topic not dealt with in 
this Report. 
83 Thus the responses of Sky and Vodafone to Ofcom’s UK telecommunications strategy review strongly favour this approach.  
84 For instance France permits public investments in vDSL only if the investing Authority has identified its path to FTTH, including 
finance http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000024473100&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id 
FIGURE 1: FTTC DEPLOYMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL ACCESS LINES 
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FIGURE 2: TELECOM NETWORK OPERATOR - TYPE ACROSS COUNTRIES IN 2014 
 
 
It should be noted that, in general, there is little or no overlap in these FTTP networks. The typical 
pattern is of independent deployment, followed by the striking by network owners of deals which 
were commercial or not conventionally regulated, once a critical mass is achieved. In Portugal, this 
took the form of a barter deal between Portugal Telecom and Vodafone. Agreements in Spain are 
a combination of co-investment and indefensible rights of use (IRU),85 while the French operators 
are likely to operate in a more tightly controlled IRU model, at least outside the denser areas.86 
Without subsequent overbuild, this creates the scope for symmetrical, as opposed to asymmetrical 
regulation, but it may also lead to overbuild and the option to deregulate access entirely.  
The hypothesis is thus that the technological choice made by the incumbent, or by the regulators, 
can mold the market structure. FTTP leads to a more even balance between the incumbent and 
competitive access seekers, creating opportunities either for more symmetrical regulation, or even 
for deregulation. On the other hand, FTTC deployment, while maintaining more control for the 
historical incumbent, and very likely requiring the permanence of asymmetric regulation, has shown 
that it can lead to a cheaper and more rapid deployment of NGN, probably also in a more 
geographically homogeneous fashion across countries.  
In conclusion, with the example of FTTC vs. FTTH, we have asked and discussed the question about 
whether there is a potential ‘market failure’ case for intervening in technology choice on the basis 
of regulatory or competition considerations. We stress that we are not, on this occasion, taking a 
position on whether this consideration should guide regulatory policy, but pointing to the possible 
existence of theoretical grounds from which to depart from TN and to the existence of regulatory 
trade-offs that may, or may not, lead to bending TN.  
 
                                               
85http://inversores.bolsa.jazztel.com/documents/10156/219926/JAZZTEL+signs+a+Vertical+Infrastructure+Access+Agreem
ent+with+Telef%C3%B3nica 
86 http://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx_gspublication/consult-modele-tarifs-FttH-160514.pdf 
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4 THE FORM OF FTTP: P2P VS. PMP 
 
It is well known that fiber to the premises can take two distinct topological forms: point to point 
(P2P), in which each customer is provided with an individual unshared fiber from the point of 
presence; or point to multipoint (PMP) - in which each user has his/her own fiber access line up to a 
distribution point, in the same way that copper networks are deployed today. Over these 
topologies, different technologies can be layered, such as GPON or Ethernet, and although GPON 
is often associated with PMP, it can equally be deployed on a P2P network. However, fiber PMP 
can only be physically unbundled at the splitter locations, which are normally very close to the end 
customers. As these serve a limited number of customers, unbundling at these locations is 
commercially harder to justify. Further dimensions of choice can be identified, the most important of 
which concerns the form of PMP that is deployed.87  
The issue discussed here is whether the choice between P2P and PMP should be left to the firms 
concerned, or whether (and if so, how) the regulator might depart from technological neutrality in 
order to influence the extent and form of the access technology which the alternatives can support 
– essentially, to counteract the abridgement of the competition effect which an operator installing a 
fiber network may be exercising88.  
The limitations on the physical unbundling of a PMP network have already been noted. There is, 
however, another possibility, wavelength division multiplexing (WDM), in which multiple signals, on 
laser beams, are combined at various infrared wavelengths, and then separated. This turns a PMP 
network into a virtual P2P, with the difference that (unlike bitstream and VULA virtual access 
products) the virtual access path is unfettered; an access seeker controlling the light wave would 
enjoy technical independence, in the same way as if s/he held a physical access path. Considering 
WDM deployment introduces further technical refinements: the difference between splicing and 
‘pre-connectorising’ the fibers in the network – a distinction which influences the deployment cost of 
WDM, or rather, of a ‘WDM-ready’ network-89. 
The question of the unbundling of fiber networks is expressly addressed in an Analysys Mason 
consultancy report for Ofcom, covering case studies in seven countries of interest.90 This notes that in 
the six countries where fiber to the premises is utilised, one used P2P, and five solely or primarily 
GPON. In terms of passive access remedies, there is a mixed picture: in Singapore, most access 
seekers purchase passive PON network access for their customers, including the splitter, which is 
managed by the (separated) network operator; it provides access back to one of the nine central 
offices which serve the country91. Spain and Portugal have concluded that it is not (or not yet) 
possible to unbundle a GPON network. In New Zealand, the availability of passive access products 
for the residential market has been deferred to 2020. Finally, in France, the network is either PON 
or P2P, that is, it is point to point from the mutualisation point to the end customer, allowing splitters 
to be used at, or above, the mutualisation point. In summary, the report concludes that ‘while several 
regulators have commented that it is not feasible to unbundle a GPON network, others have simply 
implemented this, proving that it can be done (at least for certain deployments).”92 
                                              
87 See, for example, Shortall (2011) and Jay et al. (2014). 
88 We are not asserting here that it has been proven that any operator has done this deliberately, thus far. 
89 The key change to move from a current generation PMP to WDM PMP would be to upgrade the splitters in the network. In a 
spliced deployment, this is difficult and expensive, in a pre-connectorised network it is not. 
90 Analysys Mason (2015). The countries appear to have been chosen for their intrinsic interest, rather than as being 
representative. They are Belgium, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore and Spain. 
91 This small number limits the investments required by access seekers in order to provide a ubiquitous service.  
92 Ibid. Pp. 20-21, 24-25. 
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It is worth noting that the choices that are made today will influence greatly what the future 
upgrade path looks like. Operators that wish to deploy WDM would be likely to build it with that 
upgrade in mind (as in the USA, Portugal, Spain, where short term pressure from cable and/or 
competing FTTH networks makes much higher bandwidth desirable in the foreseeable future), than 
in areas where access competition is weaker or more limited (as in France and the UK). It could be 
argued that being WDM-ready - i.e., adopting a pre-connectorised solution - may change the 
perspective over 5 years, in terms of whether light wave unbundling is a proportionate remedy, or 
not.   If the network is WDM-ready, then its use may be proportionate, but if the network is spliced 
then it may not be. However, as in the FTTP/FTTC evolution described above, policy decisions 
made today may push future regulation either one way or the other.  
On the bright side, the technology does seem to suggest that while operators facing the design 
choice between P2P, PMP and the type of PMP, may also be influenced by competitive 
considerations, no foreclosure motive probably may be achieved on a durable basis. An operator 
may gain time, and may also be able to momentarily raise rivals’ costs (see the above discussion 
about pre-connectorisation), but technical developments seem destined to mitigate the worst 
outcomes, particularly where the investment decision happens in the face of strong infrastructure 
based competition.    
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Broadband targets are probably a response to the perception that broadband carries the 
potential to exercise a positive influence on the European economy. We have noted that the 
existence of such targets can have an impact on technological choice, and have observed, at the 
same time, that regulators’ concerns to promote infrastructure competition can also influence such 
choices.  
It is suggested, in the two case studies above, that in certain circumstances, giving operators an 
untrammelled power to make technological choices could, in principle, have an impact on market 
outcomes. The FTTC vs. FTTP issue is an illustration where, in theory, a departure from TN in favour 
of FTTP might be argued to have some beneficial effect on the market structure, even if probably 
at the expenses of a slower deployment of NGN. Paradoxically, however, the major advantages 
may be available in urban areas, where a policy intervention would face other impediments (State 
aid policies), or would have dis-advantages (crowding out of private investment) which overcome 
those benefits.93 Similar issues may arise for today’s policy makers in the specific design of FTTP 
networks. At present, there may be some benefit in terms of the promotion of competition in the 
P2P variant that uses WDM over PMP, since it is a minor variation on the dominant technology 
choice that opens up future access possibilities, but without a deep analysis of the effective trade-
offs, this also remains, essentially, a theoretical consideration.  
In synthesis, the original rationale for TN remains valid, and an overly specific approach brings its 
own serious dangers. Maxwell and Bourreau’s conception of TN captures this best. From this 
viewpoint, policy makers may set the desirable characteristics which they want to reach, and then 
reward them or punish them for their absence.  
In all cases, a policy maker would be better advised to indicate its preferred technology, in 
terms of the characteristics to be delivered or outputs, rather than in terms of network design or 
inputs. It might thus say that it wants to see speeds in excess of some level (as happens already), 
which can also go to some other limit in the future. The regulator might say it has targets, in terms 
of latency, since it sees real-time virtual services as being important, and so on. However, in order 
                                              
93 These would have to be examined on a case-by-case basis, which would not be easy. 
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to make use of firms’ knowledge of comparative costs, such type targets are better realised via 
price-based incentives than through instruction or prohibition.  
Moreover, other factors also make such decisions more difficult. One is the optimal scale of fiber 
deployment. The discussion above essentially applies only to more densely populated areas, the 
only ones where the more expensive technology is economically feasible. In choosing between FTTC 
and FTTP, or among alternative FTTP technologies, such private cost differences must be traded off 
against the importance of a possibly more competitive market.  
Second, path dependence may be important: that is, a country’s decision to sink investment into one 
technology model, rather than going straight to the technology preferred by the policy maker, 
may concretely affect the desirability of the preferred technology as the ultimate goal.  
Finally, even if one can identify a case where all the risks to abandon TN can be overlooked, 
implementation by direct fiat or command, and control methods, would remain hazardous in the 
light of the asymmetry of information between the regulator and a firm, while a price guided 
method, which left the final say with the operator, might be much safer.  
So, where does this leave TN? It was noted at the outset that, within the range of objectives 
currently set for regulators, and specifically within the current European regulatory framework, at 
least in theory, there may sometimes be grounds for departing from an instrumental principle, 
such as TN, but our analysis confirms that any such departure should be carefully appraised, 
and that the numerous and complex trade-offs of this choice may be very difficult to ascertain.  
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CHAPTER 4 |Implications of target-oriented 
broadband public investment 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Mostly driven by a belief in the growth-enhancing effects of broadband technologies, as recalled 
in Chapter 1, many governments around the world have decided to set targets in terms of ultra-
fast broadband coverage. These broadband targets have generally been translated into at least 
some public investment. The size of this investment, and the choices made as regards its provision, 
vary greatly across countries. Korea, Japan and Australia, for instance, are often cited for the 
relevance of the public funds that are committed to reaching ambitious broadband targets. The 
Australian government, in particular, has decided to finance the construction of a nation-wide 
network through a government-owned company that has also envisaged the ‘buy out' of the 
existing major fixed line cable and copper infrastructures, thus willingly leading to a publicly-
owned fiber network (natural) monopoly. Other countries, including in the European Union, have 
adopted less intrusive approaches. 
The extent of public involvement in broadband rollout usually depends on the nature of the 
broadband targets set by the decision-makers. The more ambitious the targets, the greater the 
perceived “market failure” identified as a rationale for public intervention, and the greater the 
extent of public resources required to address it. In particular, targets formulated in terms of wide 
Fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) coverage entail the strongest need for public investment to make up for a 
weak private investment business case.  
Public investment affects the nature of competitive interaction and market structure in multiple 
ways. In the case of fiber deployments, these effects are likely to be particularly significant, 
considering that the economics of NGA networks often implies that only one or two fiber networks 
may be viable in any given area. Given the strict relationship between public investment and 
broadband targets, the latter should thus be carefully selected.  
In this chapter, we consider how the relationship between broadband targets, public investment in 
broadband deployment, and the competitive dynamics plays out in Europe. The chapter is 
exploratory in nature, as very little economic literature tackles this question directly, to our 
knowledge. The aim of the chapter is twofold: on the one hand, we hope to stimulate reflection on 
the impact that the current approach to target-oriented public investment in ultra-fast broadband 
is likely to have on competitive interaction in the EU; on the other hand, we put forward some 
thoughts on the effect that raising speed targets beyond the current level, so that deployment of 
certain technologies will be explicitly discouraged in favour of FTTH solutions, may be expected to 
have on market structure, and whether, from an economic standpoint, this would be a desirable 
policy to adopt. 
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2 THE CURRENT EU APPROACH TO PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN ULTRA-FAST 
BROADBAND 
Target-oriented public investment may be made from the basis of a range of different motives94. 
Acknowledgement of the existence of an instance of market failure features prominently among 
the economic motives. As highlighted in Chapter 1, numerous positive externalities are associated 
with broadband deployment that benefit the citizens of the country where the infrastructure is built, 
but they are not directly appropriated by the operators undertaking the investment. A motive that 
is more political in nature, although generally cast in economic terms, is given by the pursuit of 
industrial policy objectives, such as the competitiveness of the ICT industry, or of the economy 
generally. Finally, the main non-economic motive for public investment is given by the equity 
considerations that lead to the adoption of ‘universalization’ policies that are meant to reduce, or 
eliminate, the ‘digital divide’, and to promote social inclusion. 
All of these public policy objectives feature in the EU Digital Agenda for Europe, together with the 
additional objective of European integration. As one of the flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 
Communication95, the Digital Agenda, as mentioned in previous chapters, sets specific targets in 
terms of broadband coverage and speed. To enable the achievement of these targets, it 
encourages member States to devise national plans to stimulate broadband roll-out through public 
funding that is drawn from national resources, or from EU-level sources, such as the European 
Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF, for all types of regions), the Rural Development Fund (EAFRD, 
in rural areas) and the Connecting Europe Facility. 
The 2012 update to the Digital Agenda96 makes this so explicit, that it can be conceived of as a 
tool of industrial policy, and that public investment in broadband infrastructures is not only 
accepted, but encouraged. Indeed, one of the main priorities is described as follows: 
“Regaining world leadership for network services, by stimulating private investment in high-speed 
fixed and mobile broadband networks, enabled by legal predictability improved planning and 
targeted private and public EU and national funding.” 
While considered legitimate, public investment in broadband infrastructures is subject to the 
limitations imposed by the EU State aid policy. A guiding principle of the European Union is, 
indeed, the acknowledgement that public intervention may affect – and distort – the competitive 
dynamics of the market, and therefore that any State aid should be devised in a way that avoids, 
as much as possible, distortionary effects, particularly in terms of crowding out private investment 
and unduly favouring specific firms at the expense of their competitors. EU State aid regulation, 
thus, acts as a brake on arbitrary public investment by, in principle, directing public resources 
towards areas where a market failure can be identified.  
The main document enshrining the EU State aid policy in this domain are the Broadband State Aid 
Guidelines97. The Guidelines translate the fundamental notion that public investment in broadband 
should be limited to addressing market failures and relevant equity concerns into the well-known 
distinction between “white”, “grey” and “black” areas. For both basic broadband and NGA 
                                              
94 Cave and Martin (2010). 
95 European Commission (2010c); Council of the European Union (2010). 
96 European Commission (2012). 
97 Other relevant documents are the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), i.e., Commission Regulation (EU) 
N°651/2014 of 17th June, 2014, declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market through the 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, and the Regional Aid Guidelines for 2014-2020 (Official Journal C209, 
23.07.2013). 
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networks, State aid is likely to be compatible with the internal market in white areas, where neither 
a provider is operating, nor are there plans to operate in the next three years; the aid is to be 
subject to a full compatibility assessment in grey areas, where only one provider is operating, and 
no other provider is likely to operate in the next three years. It is, in general, excluded in black 
areas, where there are or there will be in the next three years, two or more operators providing 
basic broadband. 
When a public funding measure qualifies as State aid98, in order to be authorized by the 
European Commission it has to comply with specific and cumulative ‘compatibility conditions’. In 
addition to addressing a market failure, or important inequalities, the measure has to achieve an 
objective of common interest, be appropriate as a policy instrument, have an incentive effect, be 
limited to the minimum that is necessary, entail limited negative effects, and be “transparent”. 
Moreover, the design of the measure should be aimed at limiting the distortions of competition. 
One of the key design features indicated in the Guidelines in this regard is the principle of 
technological neutrality (on which see above, Chapter 3). 
Regardless the “colour of the area”, public sponsors need also to demonstrate that the State aid 
involves a “step change”, in terms of broadband availability. A step change would result if public 
intervention spurred: (a) significant new investment; and (b) enhanced capabilities, in terms of 
broadband service availability, capacity, speed and competition (e.g., effective wholesale access 
and/or unbundling). The extent of the step change to be substantiated, however, depends on the 
technological characteristics of the networks in the different areas99.  
The design of the State aid measure should also include rules on effective third party wholesale 
access, which is imposed on the network regardless of whether the operator is found to have 
Significant Market Power (SMP) under the broader EU telecommunications regulatory framework. 
According to the Broadband Guidelines, “subsidized companies should provide a wider range of 
access products than those mandated by NRAs under sectoral regulation to the operators that have 
significant market power”, and wholesale access should be granted as early as possible before 
starting the network operation, and for a period of at least 7 years. 
The pursuit of the efficiency, equity, industrial policy and integration objectives of the DAE thus 
occurs within the framework of the principles of competition incorporated into the State aid policy. 
However, the DAE’s targets and industrial policy objectives have, to a non-negligible extent, 
explicitly permeated the State aid rules100. The 2013 revised version of the Broadband State Aid 
Guidelines, in line with the more general process of State Aid Modernization, explicitly mentions, 
among its aims, a desire to “achieve the coverage objectives set at European level to spur economic 
growth and development” and to “facilitate well-designed aid targeting market failures or providing 
a more desirable, equitable market outcome from a cohesion policy point of view”.  
In practice, this approach translates into a rather flexible interpretation of the market failure 
principle while applying State aid rules in the broadband domain, one that, to some extent, bends 
                                              
98 The existence of state aid is excluded if the broadband network is deployed for a non-commercial use (e.g., NN24/2007 
Public sector network, Prague), if the so-called “Market economy investor principle” (MEIP) applies (e.g., C53/06 Citynet 
Amsterdam), and when the broadband deployment fulfils the criteria of the Altmark test and can thus be considered to be a 
service of general economic interest (e.g., N331/2008 Hauts de Seine).  
99 For instance, in white broadband areas, deployment of basic broadband thus qualifies as a step change, while in white 
NGA areas, where the existing infrastructure is given by ADSL/VDSL at the MDF, another basic broadband infrastructure 
would not satisfy the step change requirement, while a FTTC/VDSL in the cabinet solution would. Similarly, deployment of an 
FTTB/FTTH solution, where only an FTTC/VDSL at the cabinet network is available, would be sufficient to indicate that a step 
change is present. 
100 Sauter(2013). 
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the principle to industrial policy objectives. This is particularly apparent in relation to the 2013 
provisions concerning the compatibility of direct public funding in black NGA areas. In these areas, 
where at least two NGA networks from different operators exist, the public funding of the rollout 
of a new network may still be considered as compatible State aid if the publicly financed new 
NGA network constitutes a “step change”, and it is able to provide ultra-fast speeds that are well 
above 100 Mbps101. It is at least dubious that these market features can indicate an instance of 
market failure. Many economists would disagree, or, in any event, conclude that the empirical 
evidence is at present insufficient to support such a view of market failure (see Chapter 1 and, 
below, Section 4).  
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the Broadband Guidelines incorporate a specific view of the 
form that competitive interaction should take in areas financed by public resources. By requiring 
subsidized firms to offer a wide range of access products, both passive (access to civil engineering 
infrastructures, particularly ducts) and active (including wholesale bitstream products), these “open 
access” rules reflect the view that competition needs to be ensured, when public funds are involved, 
at both the passive and active levels. 
This approach may be considered, in practice, if not in principle, to be in line with the broader EU 
regulatory framework for NGA infrastructures. Indeed, the European Commission recommendation 
on “regulated access to next generation access networks”102, basically extends the existing 
regulatory model in place for the first-generation copper infrastructures to the emerging NGA 
networks, advising NRAs to impose the entire range of access remedies to operators who are 
found to have significant market power (SMP operators). In particular, as regards active remedies, 
the recommendation foresees immediate bitstream access and the unbundling of any type of 
technology.  
3 PUBLIC INVESTMENT, PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND MARKET STRUCTURE 
UNDER THE CURRENT EU APPROACH 
Public investment to promote broadband rollout can take many forms. Supply-side policies are, of 
course, the most intrusive forms of intervention, those most likely to directly affect operators’ choices 
and market structure. Particularly in the case of nascent NGA networks, for which it could be 
possible that only one or two operators may viably invest in network deployment, supply-side 
interventions may ultimately influence who gets to participate in the market.  
The actual effect on competition in supply-side interventions depends on a range of policy 
variables being in the hands of public sponsors: 
• Level of investment in the broadband infrastructure – public investment may occur at the 
backbone (e.g., the Korean KII-Public network and the publicly-funded Swedish public 
backbone), at the backhaul (especially in France) and/or at the access level (e.g., the 
creation of Metropolitan Area Networks (MANs) or subsidy schemes, as, for instance, in 
                                              
101 In black NGA areas, the following cumulative criteria apply in order to substantiate the existence of a step change: 
• The existing NGA networks, and those planned for the next 3 years, do not reach the end-users premises with fiber 
networks;  
• The market situation is not evolving towards the achievement of a competitive provision of ultra-fast services above 
100 Mbps in the near future, by the investment plans of commercial operators.  
• A demand for such qualitative improvements is expected.  
102 European Commission (2010b)  
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Germany)103;  
• Choice of geographical location of investment – public financing should be directed 
predominantly to areas where no existing broadband provider operates (white areas), the 
main aim being to address the digital divide. They may only exceptionally be directed 
towards areas where operators are already active, with the purpose of promoting 
competition and/or network upgrades;  
• Level of involvement of the public entity – publicly funded projects can be distinguished into:  
direct investment, where the NGA is deployed and run directly by the public authority, or by 
the new entity that was born from the PPP agreement; indirect investment or concession 
models, where the public authority keeps the ownership of the passive infrastructure, but 
outsources the active infrastructure; gap investments, where the public authority simply 
subsidizes one operator (or more operators if they are co-investing parties), funding the gap 
between what is commercially viable and the public target; 
• Number of public funds’ recipients – different outcomes in terms of market structure are 
associated with the choice to select a single subsidized provider in a given area, or to favour 
co-investment by multiple operators;  
• Choice of technology – in particular, the choice between FTTP and copper upgrades, and the 
choice among different FTTP technologies; 
• Wholesale access rules – the specific open access rules that are defined by the NRAs 
influence the incentives and competition. 
The impact on market structure of some of these levers is more straightforward. For instance, direct 
investment at the backhaul/backbone level aims to lower entry barriers for local operators through 
the development of backbone infrastructures connecting remote and isolated areas, and/or to 
open backhaul hubs that are closer to customers. Significant public investment in the backbone 
infrastructure has already been made in the past (e.g., in Sweden) and has perhaps only a 
residual role to play. Public investment in backhaul, by contrast, may significantly lower the entry 
barriers for mobile operators.  
A fully-fledged analysis of the impact on market structure of all of these features of public 
investment is outside the scope of this chapter. In what follows, we will focus on the effect of the 
policy levers that are most clearly related to digital targets: the choice of the geographical 
location of the investment, and the choice of technology.  
The key driver of the impact of public investment on market structure and competition under the 
current EU approach is, of course, the distinction between white, grey and black areas. The 
rationale for directing public funds towards white areas finds both theoretical and empirical 
support. Theoretically, there are reasons to conclude that the risk of crowding out is minimized in 
white areas, while a ban on public intervention may be welfare-enhancing in grey (and, a fortiori 
black) areas104. From the empirical standpoint, the only evidence that we are aware of refers to 
the specific context of the USA municipal electronic communications networks, which are managed 
by electricity utilities (and are therefore of somewhat limited use in assisting European 
policymaking), and this suggests that one can be fairly confident that crowding out will not occur 
when public intervention (municipal broadband networks) chooses areas that are demographically 
and economically different than those served by private operators (CLECs)105.  
                                              
103 Another option is to intervene at the level of international connectivity (e.g., Kelvin Project of Northern Ireland and UK).  
104 Jullien et al (2010). 
105 Hauge et al (2008).  
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In white areas, public funding-induced distortions of competition are not at stake if there is an 
enduring lack of commercial incentives to invest in NGA by any operator. The subsidized 
infrastructure is likely to remain the only one available, at least on the reasonably long time-
horizon, and therefore the only viable form of competition is likely to be services-based 
competition.  
In these areas, the main competitive issue is whether services-based competition is actually going to 
develop. IDATE106reports that the open access model, which has been adopted by public network 
deployment initiatives in several American cities, has failed to attract private Internet service 
providers (ISPs) interested in the public wholesale offer, so that, in many instances, the public 
deploy of infrastructures has had to integrate into service provision. Troulos and Maglaris107 report 
this to be an issue in Europe also, where, in spite of favouring a “wholesaler” or “common carrier” 
model, a lack of interest by commercial operators has led to the adoption of a service-provider 
model for the publicly-funded infrastructure.  
Public intervention in both grey and black NGA areas involves substantially higher risks of 
crowding out and of distortions of competition, as public intervention ‘forcefully’ introduces 
competition in a context where private investment has already occurred, and an infrastructure 
already exists that provides similar services, and where competitive interaction has already 
developed. The “step change” requirement entails that public financing in these areas can be 
understood to ‘promote competition with a stronger (more technologically advanced) competitor’ 
which is, in turn, subject to the mentioned comprehensive third-party access obligations.  
In these areas, the actual impact of public funding on competition is heavily influenced by the 
sponsor’s choice of technology. In grey areas, sponsors have two main possibilities within the 
context of fixed broadband, depending on local conditions. In particular, they may choose 
between FTTC/VDSL (copper upgrades) and FTTB/FTTH solutions. 
The choice of funding copper upgrades in grey areas may ensure the availability of connections 
with speeds currently being up to 100 Mbps, and prospectively up to 1 Gb (with G.fast and 
similar technologies), at a relatively low cost and within a shorter timeframe than full-fiber 
solutions. In terms of market structure, this choice preserves the pre-existing model of services-
based competition which is based on wholesale access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. This, in turn, 
may have the effect of delaying or displacing fiber investment, because it may make it harder for 
fiber investors to aggregate sufficient demand when a relatively well performing alternative is 
already in place. On the brighter side, of course, this solution ensures more rapid deployment. 
Moreover, given that some technologies are relatively less amenable to unbundling (e.g., vectoring) 
an issue emerges as to the most appropriate regulatory solutions to allow the implementation of 
the “open access” model that is foreseen by the Broadband Guidelines.  
When FTTH is the chosen technology in grey areas, the market outcome depends on the identity of 
the selected operator. If the recipient of the public funds is the legacy network incumbent, the main 
effect of public investment is to accelerate the substitution of copper with fiber. In this case, again, 
the pre-existing model of services-based competition, which is based on wholesale access to the 
incumbent’s infrastructure, carries on to the fiber environment. If an alternative operator is the 
recipient of public funds, the latter will introduce infrastructure competition with the copper 
operator in a context where competition, previous to the introduction of the State aid measures, is 
entirely services-based, as there is a de facto monopoly in first generation broadband, or in NGA.  
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107 Troulos and Maglaris (2011). 
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In black areas, the requirement for a “step change” entails that public sponsors can only fund FTTH 
deployments. Public funding thus introduces infrastructure-based competition between an all-fiber 
network and the pre-existing networks, in a context where both infrastructure-based and services-
based competition is in play before public funding is introduced. This accelerates copper 
substitution, but may imply that multiple networks operate on a less than efficient scale for a longer 
period than would have spontaneously occurred. 
In these areas, in addition to the standard risk of crowding out, or to the replacement of private 
investment, public intervention may also interfere with operators’ capacity to benefit from the 
investment they have already made, and, therefore, undermine their ability to undertake further 
investment. To address this risk, Article 84(c) of the Broadband Guidelines foresees that, in black 
NGA areas, the aid granting authority must demonstrate that “the aid does not lead to an excessive 
distortion of competition with other NGA technologies that have recently been the subject of significant 
new infrastructure investments by market operators in the same target areas”. However, given the 
long payback periods of most network infrastructures, there seems to be still ample scope for 
public investment to jeopardize past private investments, unless this provision is interpreted 
extensively.  
Finally, in both grey and black areas, a question emerges with regard to the strength of the 
‘multiplier effect’ that public investment is able to generate. On the one hand, private operators’ 
overall incentives to invest in NGA may, on balance, be not as high as was intended in the 
presence of a public investment, because of the rules on third party access and of the claw back 
provisions that are associated with State aid. While on the other hand the open access model 
seems, indeed, to be a reasonable tool to prevent public funding from “picking winners” in a given 
local market, and to avoid costly duplications of investment. Nonetheless, it does raise an important 
question as to the extent of private investment that public investment will be able to spur.. 
Moreover, the claw-back provisions included in the Broadband Guidelines, which foresee that any 
unexpected upside from the network investment should be shared with the public sponsor, also cap 
the incentives of the recipient of public funds. This may entail that the extent of public funds that 
are needed to trigger private investment may be substantial and, again, it suggests caution in 
deploying public investment in areas where alternative networks already exist, albeit with a lower 
performance. On the other side, the perspective of the availability of public funds may affect the 
timing of deployment, giving rise to a sort of ‘dynamic crowding out’. Private investors may, 
indeed, postpone investment until uncertainty about the availability of public subsidies is resolved, 
even in areas where, in principle, there may have been a profitable business case. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the extent to which public intervention involves co-investment by 
multiple operators, also affects the market structure. Co-investment agreements have increasingly 
received attention in the policy debate, due to their mix of avoiding inefficient infrastructure 
duplication and reducing investment risks for each of the operators involved, thereby ensuring a 
fair level of investment incentives and competition. In order for co-operative investment agreements 
to deploy all of these potential benefits, contract provisions must be such that contracting parties 
can access the NGA at cost-based or zero charges, to avoid high side-payments creating a similar 
effect to that of the high termination rates. The theoretical economic literature on co-investing 
agreements108 finds that they seem to have a positive effect on investment incentives, but the 
resulting level of competition in the market will depend on the number of insiders to the agreement, 
and on the existence of NGA access regulation to guarantee fair conditions to access seeking 
outsiders to the agreement. A strict supervision by competition authorities is strongly advisable in 
order to control potential collusion between co-investing operators, which might undermine most of 
the societal benefits from the co-investment. 
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46 The future of broadband policy: public targets and private investment 
 
To sum up, public investment in broadband deployment, under the current European policy 
framework, does maintain an element of potential distortion of competitive dynamics. This element 
is primarily linked to the fact that the very definition of market failure, as per the Broadband 
Guidelines, depends on the DAE targets, and on the assumption that higher-speed NGA 
infrastructures bring substantial additional positive externalities if compared to lower speed ones. 
It is to a discussion of this assumption, and of whether it would be worth further extending its policy 
implications, that we now turn.  
4 PUBLIC INVESTMENT, PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND MARKET STRUCTURE IN 
THE PRESENCE OF HIGHER PUBLIC TARGETS 
The discussion so far has highlighted that the setting of broadband targets, in terms of coverage 
and speed, has been an important part of the policy mix adopted at the European level. It is a 
(meta-) policy tool, which is susceptible to significantly influence market structure when public 
financing is involved, through the role it plays in the Broadband Guidelines. One important issue 
that is worth addressing, especially in view of the current EU Commission’s public consultation on the 
needs for broadband speed and quality beyond 2020, is therefore whether the implementation of 
EU policy in this domain would benefit from an update and a modification of these targets. In 
particular, it is worth considering whether setting higher targets in terms of the adoption of NGA 
connections well beyond 100 Mbps, and thus expressing a specific favouring of FTTH (the only 
technology that, together with DOCSIS.3 cable, guarantees speeds well over 100 Mbps), would be 
justified. In this section, we thus explore the consequences of setting higher targets, with a view to 
identifying their likely effects on public investment, private investment and competitive dynamics. 
The analysis also proposes some insights into the implications of higher targets in the pursuit of the 
different policy objectives that are set in the DAE (efficiency, equity and industrial policy 
objectives).  
Private operators currently make their investment choices on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of 
different technological solutions where, as is well known, FTTH solutions allow for greater 
performance, but involve a significantly higher cost of deployment, while FTTN solutions guarantee 
lower speeds at much lower costs. It is at least doubtful that higher EU-level targets would change 
significantly the private operators’ cost-benefit assessment of the different technological solutions. 
However, higher targets certainly signal to national and local public authorities the priorities that 
they are expected to have in choosing how, and where, to direct public funding, as well as the 
desirable scope of their intervention.  
A first effect of setting higher targets is thus likely to be an increase in the scope for public 
investment. To translate into effective deployment, the policy choice of technological solutions, that 
guarantee speeds well over 100 Mbps for a higher percentage of the population, is likely to imply 
a need for more public investment to make up for private investment in areas where operators 
have already invested, or who would have invested in NGA networks with lower performance, 
even if they were more than adequate to meet consumer needs. Moreover, it is also likely to 
require investment in a greater proportion of the national territory, as more areas would qualify 
as being either ‘white’ or ‘grey’ if measured against a benchmark of the availability of very high 
speed NGA.  
This would amount to a significant change in the European approach towards investment in NGA, 
which has so far been predominantly based on reliance on private investment. The size of the 
investment at stake, and the track record of EU public investment in broadband, so far suggests 
that a concrete implementation of this policy change is not particularly likely. According to the 
Commission’s own estimates, the achievement of the current DAE targets requires investment of 
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about €330 billion (of which about €60 billion for 100% coverage of the population at 30 Mbps, 
and €270 billion for 50% coverage of the population subscribing to 100 Mbps connections by 
2020). As of 2012, a total amount of less than €12 billion of multiannual State aid budgets for 
broadband deployment had been approved (of which possibly only a fraction has been translated 
into effective public investment)109. Even considering the very significant “multiplier effect” of public 
investment, the pursuit of the DAE targets has so far been largely dependent on private operators’ 
investment choices. Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether the rationale for a substantial 
increase in public funding, triggered by higher broadband targets, would be strong. The key 
justification for this change in approach is that very high speed NGA deployment will bring 
substantial additional positive externalities, if compared to lower performing NGAs, and/or that 
substantial public intervention is warranted by a meaningful industrial policy motive (e.g., the 
promotion of the ICT industry). 
As explained in Chapter 1, currently there is no robust evidence, nor is there enough empirical 
research, about the different extent of the positive externalities associated with NGA technologies, 
which are characterized by different speeds. While the empirical literature on the positive effects 
of broadband rollout is relatively solid, the extent to which accelerating deployment of a ‘future-
proof’ technology, such as FTTH, is justified on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that includes 
social benefits in the assessment, is much more controversial110.  
The only study that, to the best of our knowledge, clearly supports the view that a cost-benefit 
analysis including externalities would fully justify the investment to build a national FTTH P2P 
network, is one by the OECD111. The study concludes that this investment would be justified if it 
induces a cost reduction of between 0.5% and 1.5% in each of four sectors – the electricity, health, 
education and transport sectors – and over a period of 10 years. The other currently available 
studies supporting the view that increased speed adds to GDP and GDP growth112  and household 
income113 are not actually concerned with differences in speed between FTTx technologies, but 
rather they are concerned with differences among lower-performing technologies. For instance, in 
the analysis by Rohman and Bohlin114, the sample mean bandwidth is 8 Mbps, while Gruber et 
al.115 find that “there seems to be a growth impact in moving away from basic broadband, but the 
incremental speed impact on growth appears to level off”, where ‘basic broadband’ in the study is 
understood to be given by connections at 0.75 Mbps. 
The lack of empirical evidence may, of course, be linked to the scarce availability of data on NGN 
technologies. However, it may as well depend on the fact that most of the externality-generating 
applications one may think of (e-health, e-government, smart grids, etc.) do not actually require 
ultra-fast broadband to bring about social benefits. This is the conclusion reached, for instance, by 
Kenny and Kenny116, on the basis of a review of the available literature.  
The available empirical evidence is thus not sufficiently robust to conclude that abandoning the 
standard view that technological choices should be left to the market, and using public investment 
to push private operators in a specific technological direction, would amount to a wise and ‘future-
proof’ approach. Indeed, given the considerable uncertainties as to future users’ demand, 
technological evolution, and deployment costs, the standard of proof that is adopted in the 
assessment of whether the extent of incremental externalities from a specific technology is sufficient 
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to justify heavy-handed public interventions that distort technological choices, should be 
particularly high. The risk is, of course, the usual one, that of picking apparently ‘future-proof’ 
technologies that turn out not to deliver the expected benefits.   
The second effect of setting higher targets is that it makes the usual trade-off between coverage 
and performance that is involved with public investment, more stringent. Given limited public funds, 
and the large cost difference between copper upgrades and very high speed broadband 
solutions, increasing the performance requirement for publicly-funded networks necessarily entails 
reducing coverage, i.e., concentrating public resources in more limited areas. This, in turn, may 
reduce the extent to which it is possible to pursue the equity and cohesion objectives set in the DAE. 
The effect of this choice on efficiency is less clear since, as recalled in Chapter 1, since the 
empirical literature comparing the effects of broadband adoption with those of broadband 
coverage/availability is too scant to allow a meaningful assessment. However, preliminary results 
indicate that regulatory solutions (ULL price), that are meant to promote fiber, influence coverage 
more than adoption, so that excessive emphasis on fiber deployment may actually reduce the take 
up rate, thus making take up targets actually harder to achieve117.  
More generally, focusing public investment on very high speed broadband technologies may lead 
to two equally problematic outcomes in terms of coverage/performance trade-off. On the one 
side, public funds may be directed towards areas where the social cost-benefit calculus is less 
ambiguous, and investment in ultra-fast broadband technologies is more likely to be justifiable by 
substantial externalities. These are the more densely populated areas, where ICT externalities 
have empirically been found to be more sizeable. Such investment may be considered compatible 
with State aid, as per the Broadband Guidelines, even in black areas, as it would, in principle, 
qualify as a ‘step change’. This choice would, however, carry the most potential for market 
distortion and crowding out, as explained above in Section 3.  
Alternatively, public funds for ultra-fast broadband deployment may be directed towards less 
densely populated areas. This would give rise to a highly counter-intuitive situation: the 
accelerated deployment of very high speed broadband would occur in some areas where there 
are less consumers to benefit from very high speed networks, and where the extent of externalities 
is lower; while deployment in high density urban areas would occur at the (slower) pace that 
private operators would reckon to be compatible with their (private) cost-benefit calculus. The final 
result may be at odds with a meaningful interpretation of both the efficiency and the equity 
objectives of the DAE.  
An additional relevant trade-off, associated with the use of public funds in the presence of higher 
targets, may emerge between coverage and adoption. If far-reaching targets, in terms of 
performance, were set, a bias of public investment towards supply-side policies, at the expense of 
demand-side policies, would be likely to arise. Although the empirical evidence on the appropriate 
sequence of supply-side and demand-side policies is scant, and is limited to first-generation 
broadband, it nonetheless indicates that ‘one-size-doesn’t-fit-all’, as different forms of intervention 
are appropriate for different stages of broadband development118. This suggests that if EU-level 
very high speed targets were to encourage countries into a uniform policy response focusing 
predominantly on supply-side interventions, this may have negative effects in terms of adoption. 
Since what creates social welfare is the usage of services available through the networks, and not 
the availability of the network per se, this would not be a desirable policy outcome.  
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5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Targets play an important role in the overall EU-level approach to NGA network development. 
They do so both directly and indirectly, by setting the stage for national broadband plans, and by 
shaping what can be considered compatible State aid, as per the Broadband State Aid 
Guidelines. In this chapter we have questioned whether the implementation of EU policy in this 
domain would benefit from an updating and the modification of these targets, and particularly 
from the setting of higher targets in terms of the adoption of NGA connections well beyond 100 
Mbps. 
Our conclusion is in the negative. We expect higher targets to translate into a greater scope for 
public investment that, as is well known, carries a concrete risk of crowding out, or else of 
distorting private investment in areas where an infrastructure (albeit a lower-performing one) 
is already active. Moreover, higher targets would induce public decision-makers to make choices 
with regard to the trade-off between coverage and performance, and between coverage and 
adoption, that are not necessarily in line with a meaningful interpretation of the objectives of the 
Digital Agenda for Europe.  
For these reasons, we think that the standard of proof  in the assessment of whether to adopt 
heavy-handed forms of public intervention, thus forcing the market towards particular solutions, 
should be particularly high. Setting higher targets should, in other words, require a high degree of 
confidence that this is an appropriate policy choice, and therefore that there is reliance on  the fact 
that externalities are strong enough to warrant public intervention and/or that an explicit industrial 
policy motive is meaningful. Based on the empirical evidence available so far, as well as of the 
considerable uncertainties as to users’ demands and technological evolution, either of these 
conclusions is far from being warranted.  
Of course, these effects depend on there being a significant commitment of public resources. If 
substantial public resources are absent, the risks highlighted here would be greatly limited, but 
higher targets would also be likely to remain confined to paper.  
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CHAPTER 5|Policy suggestions on fast and ultra-fast 
broadband targets 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The European Commission’s public consultation is centred on understanding the necessity and 
developments of broadband deployment in Europe in the coming decades, for the eventual 
purposes of developing appropriate policies. 
The Commission re-examines and questions the adequacy of the instruments used in the past to 
promote the development of the digital economy: plans finalized to reach targets for coverage 
and adoption, regulations in favour of investment, and direct interventions in networks. In the same 
consultation, the Commission intends to explore the demand side of the market through a series of 
questions about the perceived needs for broadband in the future. 
In its inquiry, the Commission is clearly moved by the perception of a retardation in the creation of 
a European digital single market, but also by a preoccupation with the status of the European 
networks via à vis other areas of the world, especially in terms of adequacy of the level of 
investment in NGN networks and of adoption of the new technologies. The ultimate goal of the 
Commission appears to be to ensure that the EU fully benefits from the digital revolution, in terms 
of increases in industrial productivity and consumer welfare.  
The major instrument used by the Commission to foster broadband – the fixing of uniform targets 
for coverage, adoption and the speed of Internet connection in Europe – has essentially been   
suggestion. National broadband plans to subsidize the deployment of NGN networks have not so 
far translated into amounts of public investment that are comparable with those of other countries 
that have set ambitious broadband targets. To some extent, they have also been held back, even 
in rural or poor geographical areas that are unlikely to ever be serviced by private initiatives, by 
worries about competition distortion, especially under the consolidated State Aid Guidelines, that 
can only partially be adjusted to the industrial policy desiderata for the sector. Not surprisingly, 
results throughout the member States, at least for the moment, appear truly variegated.  
The fact that targets are intrinsically voluntary and non-binding, however, should not lead to and 
underestimation of their potential impact on the development of the European electronic 
communications sector. While their impact is obviously most pervasive when they are backed by 
substantial amounts of public funding, they may nonetheless crucially affect operators’ choices and 
incentives, as well as the overall competitive dynamics through regulation, and by shaping the 
direction of the limited public investment available. 
This would particularly be the case if a modification of the current targets was sought with the 
purpose of providing an additional stimulus to ultra-fast broadband deployment and, more 
specifically, if more demanding targets were set that extended the coverage requirements for 
ultra-fast broadband technologies (notably, FTTH) beyond the current level.  
Moving from the awareness of the relevance of the role that targets play in shaping the overall 
policy approach to broadband development, the present Report did not seek to answer the many 
complex questions that this consultation has raised, but has instead concentrated on two central 
issues. First, are connection and adoption targets in national and supra-national broadband plans 
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a realistic and useful tool? And, second, would an upgrade to the current set of targets be justified 
on the basis of solid economic reasoning? 
In this chapter, we draw some (tentative) policy conclusions, based on the articulated analysis 
conducted in the previous chapters (see Section 2). Overall, we express a strongly sceptical view 
about both the general usefulness of targets, and the rationale for adopting more demanding 
targets than those currently in place. We also propose some reflections on the methodological 
approach that we think would be appropriate for the evaluation of any changes to the current 
targets (Section 3). Finally, we advocate caution with regard to the possibility of a target-induced 
muddling of industrial policy and regulation (Section 4). 
2 THE RATIONALE AND IMPACT OF DIGITAL TARGETS IN EU POLICY MAKING 
The analysis in the previous chapters has provided a number of insights that are useful in 
addressing the main questions at the core of this Report.  
The first set of considerations relates to the rationale for uniform targets, in general, and to the 
rationale for targets that are specified in terms of the extended coverage of ultra-fast broadband 
technologies, specifically. In this regard, the analysis concludes that the setting of uniform targets 
does not appear to rest on a solid economic rationale, either within or across countries. Data show 
that, in general, broadband penetration and adoption do produce sizeable externalities, which, in 
general, justify the adoption of public policies to support broadband rollout and adoption. 
However, broadband impact tends to be very heterogeneous. In fact, it varies when employed by 
firms, or individuals, depending on their particular characteristics in particular areas, and therefore 
it is difficult to extrapolate an overall impact. Even within countries, the rationale for uniform 
targets does not thus appear to be solid.  
The analysis in the previous chapters has also highlighted the extreme heterogeneity that exists 
with regard to the adoption and take-up of broadband technologies, as well as of fast vs. ultra-
fast technologies. Countries without a high-quality copper legacy network have migrated towards 
fiber faster compared to countries where, instead, an existing copper-based network was 
available and could therefore be rapidly upgraded in various effective and less expensive ways.  
Moreover, the gap between adoption and coverage is still large, and is different in EU founding 
member States and the Eastern European countries. From this perspective, also, it can be safely 
concluded that one size does not fit all. In particular, attention should be paid to the fact that the 
economic rationale for investing in FTTH solutions is different for countries where substantial 
investment in copper upgrades have already been sunk as opposed to countries where the choice 
of technology may not be influenced by past investment. 
As for targets that are specified in terms of the extended coverage of ultra-fast broadband 
technologies, we can conclude that the existing evidence is not sufficient to make a case for 
expressing a preference across the board for FTTH solutions. To clearly support the view that an 
extension of ultra-fast broadband targets would be justified, it would be necessary to find 
evidence, either of the fact that significant positive externalities are not reflected in the current 
level of demand for ultra-fast broadband, so that there is a wedge between social goals and 
individual choices, or that a sufficient willingness to pay exists that is not met by private demand 
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due, for instance, to co-ordination problems. The available empirical evidence does not allow us to 
reach either of these conclusions.  
While there are many studies that find robust evidence of direct and indirect benefits for society 
that stem from broadband deployment, few of them concentrate on the relative benefits of ultra-
fast broadband, and those that do, compare it with relatively low speeds levels, not allowing 
meaningful conclusions for the comparison between FTTH and copper upgrades to be drawn.  
The literature on NGN demand is also scant and is unable to clearly provide empirical support for 
the proposition that broader FTTH targets than those currently embedded in the DAE would be 
justified on solid economic grounds. There exist only a few economic studies that present robust 
analysis on the end-users’ willingness to pay for migrating from copper to fiber connections, i.e., in 
estimating the so called “fiber premium”. Most of this evidence suggests that customers are likely to 
have a high incremental willingness to pay for a high speed service, but a low incremental 
willingness to pay for a very high speed services. This is confirmed by the low adoption of ultra-
fast broadband services in most EU countries. Moreover, it is unclear whether the network effects 
that may be considered to justify policies that encourage migration towards NGNs, are linked to 
some specific level of speed or adoption, and would therefore also justify the selective approach 
of these policies towards FTTH.  
Data show that heterogeneity across member States also exists in this regard, again suggesting 
that uniform and far-reaching targets may not be an appropriate policy choice. Indeed, Eastern 
European economies that lack an established basic broadband legacy network are subject to a 
less pronounced replacement effect on the supply side, as well as substantially lower switching 
costs on the demand side. The social cost-benefit calculus concerning the deployment of FTTP 
solutions is therefore necessarily different in these countries from this perspective also. 
All in all, there is thus no consensus, either in the specialized economic literature, or in the industry, 
regarding the incremental benefits that are brought about by immediately rolling-out an all fiber 
network, while its elevated rollout costs are undisputed. Other, less costly, technologies, which 
partly continue to exploit the surprising resilience of the copper network, such as G.fast, may soon 
offer speeds from 700MB up to 1Gb, which could satisfy the levels of demand in the near/medium 
term future.119 However, this technology, but also certain versions of all fiber technologies, may 
propose new regulatory problems in terms of wholesale access to the network, challenging what is 
probably the last fundamental tenet of European regulation.  
An additional issue that has been considered in the Report is whether there may be other market 
failures, different from externalities, that suggest the promotion of specific technologies, FTTP vs. 
FTTC and FTTH P2P vs. PMP. In particular, the possibility that departures from the technology 
neutrality principle meant to explicitly favour FTTP and FTTH P2P may be justified on the grounds 
that they could allow to address problems due to the dominance of the incumbent operators was 
explored. In this regard, the overall conclusion is cautious, both with regard to substance and with 
regard to the methods.  
A very rigorous version of TN, which gives no guidance at all in terms of outcomes, can allow 
choices by dominant firms, which may totally or partially foreclose competition. FTTP, especially 
FTTH P2P solutions, may ensure more competitive outcomes in exchange for greater development 
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costs. However, this option appears to be sustainable only in the most densely populated urban 
areas, where the more expensive technology is economically feasible. Elsewhere, it is clear that the 
desired benefits, in terms of increased competition from an explicit technology choice, would not 
materialize, given the lack of compatibility of this choice with private operators’ incentives. Within 
urban areas, where operators have expressed a preference for FTTH investment, there may be 
some benefits, in terms of the promotion of competition in the P2P variant using WDM over PMP, 
since it is a minor variation on the dominant technology choice that opens up superior future access 
possibilities. 
Thus, the original rationale for TN in principle remains valid, and an overly specific approach 
brings its own dangers. Prescribing specific technological solutions does not allow the exploitation 
of firms’ comparative information advantage, as regards the costs and benefits of different 
technologies. Even though TN should always be considered as an instrumental principle, which may 
be abandoned if a solid economy supports the notion that it may conflict with other fundamental 
objectives, any departure from it should be grounded on solid analysis and be undertaken with 
caution.  
Finally, the Report provides insights on the consequences and desirability of the voluntary and non-
binding nature of the targets. Targets, in their present form, are a kind of soft-law instrument that 
can broadly be re-conducted into the so-called Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), a method 
that was probably codified for the first time by the European Council of Lisbon in 2000. They are 
not only voluntary and non-binding, but they are also fully respectful of the principle of 
subsidiarity, as long as their application is explicitly and entirely left to the concrete choices of 
member States. Whether they are ‘armed’ through the commitment of public resources, or through 
the adoption of specific prescriptions and sanctions, will in the end depend fully on member States.  
This approach has some advantages. First, it is an approach that appears more compatible with 
the overarching principle in policy design, which indicates that policy makers should adopt the 
measures that make the best use of private information. From this perspective, a mere indication of 
the preferred broadband deployment outcomes, in terms of coverage and speed, fares better, 
comparatively, than one that prescribes specific network designs or inputs. Moreover, the fact that 
targets are uniform on paper, but not necessarily in practice, may be conceived to leave room for 
differences at the implementation stage that can take into account heterogeneities, as well as the 
different starting points at the country level. 
However, uniform targets may affect national policies and overall market outcomes, even if they 
do not result in a homogeneous application, nor are they backed by uniform and substantial 
commitment of public funds. Targets drew by political desiderata shape both private and public 
operators’ expectations in ways that are not necessarily compatible with the very objectives that 
those targets are meant to pursue.  
Private operators’ expectation that public resources will sooner or later be found to back the EU-
level targets, may result in a waiting game, whereby private investment may be delayed, even in 
areas where a business case would otherwise exist, because of waiting promises to deliver benefits 
in terms of a public subsidy that substitutes, in part,  private investment. This may give rise to sub 
optimal results from the perspective of the DAE objectives from two, equally troubling, 
perspectives: either the investment does not happen at all, or it follows too late, in the case of 
scarce public funds; or investment does occur, but simply with public money that crowds out private 
investment.  
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The effect of targets on public decision-makers’ expectations and policy choices in the 
heterogeneous EU member States may be equally problematic. To bring concrete results, ambitious 
targets should find support in significant amounts of public investment. Indeed, since far-reaching 
targets do not change the cost-benefit comparison of different technological solutions by private 
operators directly, more public resources would be needed to effectively meet these more 
ambitious targets. An outcome where public investment increases substantially is, however, not only 
relatively unlikely, but also, by and large, undesirable, since public investment, as is well known, 
carries a concrete risk of crowding out, or else of distorting private investment in areas where a 
broadband infrastructure (albeit lower-performing) is already active.  
Moreover, higher targets would induce public decision-makers to make choices with regard to the 
trade-off between coverage and performance, and between coverage and adoption, that are not 
necessarily in line with a meaningful interpretation of the objectives of the Digital Agenda for 
Europe.  
In particular, uniform targets that focus public investment on ultra-fast broadband technologies, 
almost automatically reduce coverage, because more resources are required to meet the targets in 
any given area. This may lead to two equally problematic outcomes. If public funds are directed 
towards areas where the social cost-benefit calculus is less ambiguous (urban areas), this is done at 
the expense of the equity and cohesion objectives of the DAE, and it carries the most potential for 
market distortions. If public investment in ultra-fast broadband occurs in less densely populated 
areas, a highly counter-intuitive situation ensues: the accelerated deployment of very high speed 
broadband will occur in some areas where there are consumers to benefit from very high speed 
networks, and positive externalities are clearly lower.  
Moreover, there is a risk that far-reaching targets induce public investment to be biased towards 
supply-side policies, at the expense of demand-side policies, so that coverage will be promoted at 
the expense of adoption. Since, however, it is the actual use of technologies, rather than the 
availability of networks per se that generates social welfare, it is doubtful that this outcome can be 
considered desirable in light of the DAE objectives. In this regard, it should also be noted that 
empirical evidence exists to suggest that the appropriate sequence of supply and demand side 
policies for the promotion of broadband penetration depends on the stage of infrastructure 
development. Thus, also from this perspective, uniform targets do not appear to be well grounded. 
For these reasons, we think the standard of proof that is necessary for the assessment of whether to 
adopt heavy-handed forms of public intervention, forcing the market towards particular solutions, 
should be particularly high. Setting higher targets should, in other words, require a high degree of 
confidence that this is an appropriate policy choice, and therefore confidence in the fact that 
market failure motivations are strong enough to warrant public intervention, and/or that an explicit 
industrial policy motive is meaningful. On the basis of the empirical evidence available so far, as 
well as of the considerable uncertainties as to users’ demands and technological evolution, either of 
these conclusions is far from being warranted.  
3 ON THE METHOD OF TARGET SETTING 
The soft law nature of voluntary targets entails that their decision making process is often 
extremely simplified, at least if compared to the lengthy process of legislation. Sometimes, to take 
a decision, it is considered sufficient to undertake a rapid, even relatively informal, consultation of 
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the stakeholders and some minimal information gathering.120 Clearly, however, such an informal 
process is exposed to risks, if the analysis is rapid but superficial, that the targets may easily turn 
out to be unreliable or unrealistic. Furthermore, in this instance, the very fact that whoever is setting 
the targets does not have to carefully plan their practical realization, may backfire by worsening 
the credibility of all the process. Moreover, also in cases where concrete indicators of achievement, 
i.e. the ultimate benchmarking, are left to the final actors, the member States, setting unrealistic 
targets, may introduce a bias that is difficult to overcome at a later stage. 
A further difficulty with this type of targets is that they tend to be established mainly on the basis 
of supply side considerations. The EU and member States, like any Government, when in “industrial 
policy” mode, tend to consider what they can do directly, or can possibly impose on the industry, 
but they normally eschew the much more complex task of affecting the more elusive demand side 
of the market.121 
For all these reasons, before going to our conclusion about the merits of the issue, it is important to 
reflect on the method that is presently being followed by the Commission and on its  adequacy. In 
its consultation, the European Commission purports to understand broadband needs for the future 
by directly asking households, businesses and public institutions. Considering the potential influence 
of targets on investment and future public policy, this popular consultation may be insufficient. 
Opinions and analysis play a different role, and they are different instruments. It is possible that 
EU targets are popularly invoked, but it remains true that they should be set if, and only if, this is 
really useful, and only after a careful technological and economic analysis.  
As we discussed in the introduction, soft-law has many advantages and many risks. In general, 
political imperatives appear to be a very poor guide to complex industrial choices. Moreover, we 
are in the presence of very different starting points among the member States. In the likely case 
that, in this industry as in most of the other sectors, path dependency is important, the effect of 
unique targets can lead them to irrelevance or, worse, to unexpected implications and 
consequences.122  
All this calls for a complete and detailed analysis of the impact of the eventual new targets that 
the Commission proposes to adopt for Europe. Social costs and  benefits of the investment to be 
made, also including the precise policies that are needed to achieve the objectives, should be part 
of a necessary second phase of the discussion. 
In any case, a public consultation, collecting feedbacks from citizens and stakeholders, is only a 
necessary first step to a better regulation approach, which should then be followed up with an 
accurate analysis of the impact of uniform targets. A full appraisal of the foreseen effects of 
uniform targets on demand, supply and technological advances, appears indispensable. Any 
option to adopt new targets should be compared with the two other natural options: no targets at 
all (the zero option), or differentiated targets that are to be based on the specific starting points 
of each member State. A complete impact assessment, based on alternative solutions, can constitute 
the legitimate basis from which to reach a sound decision and, in the end, to offer the potential to, 
eventually, define realistic and relevant targets for broadband in Europe. 
In the context of the Better Regulation approach, impact assessments do indeed constitute a crucial 
support enabling policy and decision makers to take wise regulatory decisions, which are, by 
consequence, strongly related to the overall market dynamics. In particular, in providing empirical 
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evidence of the market situation, and in analysing the impacts of the potential different policy and 
regulatory interventions, they represent a fundamental instrument, which is at the base of any 
efficient decision. Impact assessments do, in fact, guarantee transparency and accountability, as 
well as true compliance with the proportionality and subsidiarity principles. 
This is in line with the Better Regulation agenda of the European Commission itself and it has been 
recalled by the recent Communication of May 2015, affirming that “applying the principles of 
better regulation will ensure that measures are evidence-based, well designed and deliver tangible and 
sustainable benefits for citizens, business and society as a whole”.123  
Indeed, according to the updated Better Regulation strategy, the European Commission shall 
provide an impact assessment any time its initiatives are likely to have significant economic, 
environmental or social impacts. Setting new broadband targets for the EU, even if they remain 
only voluntary and are embodied in soft law instruments, certainly has those characteristics of 
significant economic and societal impact, which require a careful and complete assessment process.  
4 REGULATION VS. INDUSTRIAL POLICY: A NECESSARY DISTINCTION 
In the discussion about broadband targets for Europe it is important to avoid, as much as possible, 
to confuse regulatory policies, and their instruments and goals, with industrial policies. Actually, 
some authors maintain that the decline of traditional industrial policy, particularly in the form of 
planning, has been only apparently substituted by a true reliance on market forces, and, in fact, 
government and regulatory agencies have continued to pursue their plans to influence markets and 
companies through regulatory orders and agenda setting objectives.124 This view, however, cannot 
easily be accepted. 
In the words of the European Commission: "Industrial policy is horizontal in nature and aims at 
securing framework conditions favourable to industrial competitiveness. Its instruments, which are those 
of enterprise policy, aim to provide the framework conditions in which entrepreneurs and business can 
take initiatives, exploit their ideas and build on their opportunities.”125 If this is industrial policy, it 
should appear and remain clearly distinguished from regulation. In fact, the most noble and 
modern view of industrial policy, in Europe, has been primarily based on four pillar “framework” 
policies: competition, internal market, trade, and  European Monetary Union. On the contrary, 
typical sectorial industrial policies in energy, telecommunications, transport, have essentially 
remained in the hands of national governments.126  
European regulation typically represents an important middle ground, and , for several decades, it 
has had the legal standing to play a major role in shaping the regulatory framework of member 
States, in view also of the  digital single market goal, but it seeks to maintain a high degree of 
independence from national governmental policies.127 Furthermore, the EU legal framework 
requires  this independence from national governments and politics, to be guaranteed also for  
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) that implement EU rules. A confusion of EU regulation and 
national industrial policy,  facilitated by a blurred pursuit of “common” EU broadband targets, 
may offer space for nationalistic old style industrial policies and weaken the NRAs independence. 
In the end, all this could probably contribute to further fragmentation of markets, taking the EU 
even more away from the  digital single market goal.   
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Nonetheless, we have to recognize that industrial policy is an elusive concept and that there are 
alternative, and much wider, definitions. To quote Chang128: ““One interesting thing that has 
emerged from the debate on industrial policy of the last two decades or so is the recognition that 
industrial policy is more about broad ‘vision’ and co-ordination than about doling out subsidies or 
providing trade protections.”129 In a recent study for OECD, Warwick states that a representative 
definition is that “Industrial Policy is any type of intervention or government policy that attempts to 
improve the business environment or to alter the structure of economic activity toward sectors, 
technologies or tasks that are expected to offer better prospects for economic growth or societal 
welfare than would occur in the absence of such intervention.” 130  
Clearly, if the definition is so large, the broadband targets discussed in this Report probably are a 
legitimate proposal of industrial policy, as they may represent an example of the new wave of 
“soft” industrial policy. Yet, it is even more important than that they are not confused with EU 
regulation. In Europe, regulation is mandatory and economically principled: to be precise, it is 
inspired by those principles of competition that give the framework to European industries and that 
do not allow even governments to distort it. To lose this characteristic of EU regulation would be a 
price too high to pay for the sake of indicating common targets to member States.  
Finally, in full coherence with the discussion in the previous section, we underline that new forms of 
“soft” industrial policies also need a careful ex-ante impact assessment, as they are certainly not 
immune to the historical criticism of a lack of a rigorous evaluation of effectiveness, which always 
accompanies the selective political interventions of public powers in the economy. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The consultation of the European Commission on the needs for Internet speed and quality beyond 
2020 is an important occasion to reflect on the status of the European industry and the status of 
European regulation. A too negative approach to both elements may neither be warranted, nor 
may it be the best guide to assuming wise decisions.  
Europe has been, and is still today, an essential part of the Internet revolution. Its companies 
and its citizens are benefiting from the changes and are coping with them in a fashion that is 
encouraging. 
In this Report, we underline the importance of a deep understanding of the role and consequences 
of imposing EU targets, even when they are voluntary and non-binding, as in the present case.  
It is clear to us that the debate about NGNs’ deployment in Europe beyond 2020 is complex and 
fundamental. It involves a series of relevant trade-offs: we have discussed some of the most 
important, including the best way to ensure positive externalities, the control of market power, and 
the optimal equilibrium between public intervention and private investment. Unfortunately, there 
are no easy answers to any of these trade-offs, only careful economic analysis and flexibility in 
policy responses may eventually suggest solutions that are truly able to improve on autonomous 
market outcomes.  
Further, in this Report, we underline the necessity to carefully examine the sequencing of supply 
and demand policies, paying due attention to path dependency, in order to avoid undesirable 
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consequences in member States, and to consumer willingness to pay, in order to employ public 
resources in the most productive way. 
To take into correct account all of these difficult issues, we suggest to continue the discussion, and to 
reach decisions by making full use of the methods of better regulation, especially through a full 
impact assessment of any chosen broadband target.  
Finally, the Report suggests framing the analysis with the vision that it is necessary to always 
maintain and pursue the clearest distinction between industrial policies and economically principled 
regulation. The confusion between regulation and policy decisions can only blur the issues and 
bring back the debate.  
The digital single market for Europe remains an important aspiration, but there has been no 
concrete identification of the right accelerator.  
A soft industrial policy that is in the favour of the development of the NGNs throughout 
Europe can certainly be considered a worthy policy objective, but its concrete declination and 
application must pass all the necessary examinations of economic rationality and industrial 
realism. 
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